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FOREWORD
The present paper on the potential use of utility models in developing countries is part of 
the efforts of the UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable 
Development to contribute to a better understanding of issues relating to innovation and 
the place of developing countries in the globalizing knowledge based economy. Many factors 
influence the creation and preservation of systems of innovation, including education policies, 
a country’s technological absorptive capacity, its general institutional base to promote 
domestic research and development (R&D), and legal and economic incentives particularly in 
terms of adequate intellectual property and investment regimes. 
Utility models are a form of patent-like protection for minor or incremental innovations. They 
tend to protect the functional aspect of a product (examples of utility models apply to the 
functional aspects of toys, watches, optical fibres, machinery, etc). Utility models are very 
common in the mechanical, optical and electronic fields and played a role in the industrial 
development of countries like Germany and Japan, as well as South Korea and India.
With a view to fostering local technological capacity, this study examines one category 
of intellectual property, namely utility models, and their potential as a tool for spurring 
innovation, particularly in developing countries. To do so, the study draws from past 
experience to analyse their potential to accommodate small-scale or incremental innovation 
in both developed and developing countries today. 
Some experts suggest that the specific characteristics of utility models may serve as a useful 
tool for promoting the type of innovation generated in developing countries. These include: 
(i) enabling artisans to secure protection for types of innovation that do not meet the stricter 
novelty and inventive step requirements of patent law; (ii) making it possible to increase the 
role of traditional innovators and artisans in economic development; (iii) acting as a catalyst 
to enhanced levels of innovation; (iv) the fact that they are cheaper to acquire than patents; 
and (v) that they may become a source of data on innovative activity and experience in 
technological management.  Others, however argue, that regardless of the merits of utility 
models as innovation tools, it is imperative that their adoption be tailored to respond to 
each country’s industrial structure in order to have a positive impact. This study contributes 
to the understanding of the usefulness and appropriateness of utility models in developing 
countries. It also explores considerations that policy makers could take into account when 
implementing or revising their national utility model system.  
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have never been more economically and politically 
important or controversial than they are today. Patents, copyrights, trademarks, utility 
models, industrial designs, integrated circuits and geographical indications are frequently 
mentioned in discussions and debates on such diverse topics as public health, food security, 
education, trade, industrial policy, traditional knowledge, biodiversity, biotechnology, the 
Internet, the entertainment and media industries. In a knowledge-based economy, there is 
no doubt that a better understanding of IPRs is indispensable to informed policy making in all 
areas of human development. 
Empirical evidence on the role of intellectual property protection in promoting innovation 
and growth in general remains limited and inconclusive. Conflicting views also persist on 
the impacts of IPRs on development prospects. Some argue that in a modern economy, the 
minimum standards laid down in the TRIPS Agreement will bring benefits to developing countries 
by creating the incentive structure necessary for knowledge generation and diffusion, thus 
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inducing innovation, technology transfer and private investment flows.  Others counter that 
intellectual property, especially some of its elements, such as the patenting regime, will 
adversely affect the pursuit of sustainable development strategies by raising the prices of 
essential drugs to levels that are too high for the poor to afford; limiting the availability 
of educational materials for developing country school and university students; legitimising 
the piracy of traditional knowledge; and undermining the self-reliance of resource-poor 
farmers.
It is urgent, therefore, to ask the question: How can developing countries use intellectual 
property tools to advance their development strategy?  What are the key concerns surrounding 
the issues of IPR for developing countries? What are the specific difficulties they face in 
intellectual property negotiations? Is intellectual property directly relevant to sustainable 
development and to the achievement of agreed international development goals? Do developing 
countries have the capacity, especially the least developed among them, to formulate their 
negotiating positions and become well-informed negotiating partners?  These are essential 
questions that policy makers need to address in order to design intellectual property laws 
and policies that best meet the needs of their people, as well as to negotiate effectively in 
the future.
It is to address some of these questions that the UNCTAD/ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Sustainable Development was launched in July 2000. One central objective has been 
to facilitate the emergence of a critical mass of well-informed stakeholders in developing 
countries - including decision makers, negotiators but also the private sector and civil society 
- who will be able to define their own sustainable human development objectives in the 
field of intellectual property and effectively advance them at the national and international 
levels. 
We hope you will find this study a useful contribution to the debate on IPRs and sustainable 
development and particularly on the experience and use of utility models in developing 
countries. 
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz
Executive Director, ICTSD
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to assess the feasibility of utility model regimes for developing 
countries, while taking into account that utility model systems are quite varied and so analysis 
must be extended to the type of utility model system likely to be of most benefit to a country. A 
key element of utility model protection is that it is a legal instrument which is outside the sphere 
of international influence and hence tends to be specifically tailored for domestic/regional needs 
and concerns. Undoubtedly, it is well worthy considering the question of why some countries have 
utility model protection, and much of this report examines such countries and regions. 
Even if a country decides on the importance of the utility model system, there is the further need 
to analyse the type of system required. This is very important. If one references the European 
Union Member States, for example, one finds a wide disparity in the amount of applications made 
within each country, and this in turn correlates to the nature of utility model protection. Finally, 
the report considers alternative modes of protecting minor innovations such as unfair competition 
and design laws. 
Specifically, the study seeks answers to the following questions:
— Do developing countries require rapid, cheap protection for small or minor inventions, and to 
promote local industrial growth? 
— Is there an economic argument as to why such inventions should be protected?
— Would a developing country be placed at a disadvantage if other countries use a utility model 
system in a major way?
Patents vis-a-vis Public Domain
The revised current theory is that patents are tools for economic advancement that should 
contribute to the enrichment of society through (i) the widest possible availability of new and useful 
goods, services and technical information that derive from inventive activity, and (ii) the highest 
possible level of economic activity based on the production, circulation and further development of 
such goods, services and information. Once patent rights have been acquired, the owners seek to 
exploit them in the market-place. The possibility of attaining commercial benefits, it is believed, 
encourages innovation. 
The above rationale, however, should not be carried to logical absurdities and countries should not 
accept that it is necessary to allocate property rights on every intellectual output of the creator. 
Limits have to be placed on the exact breadth of patent protection of innovations, and countries 
should take note as to the effects of widening the current patent regime. After a certain period of 
time, these legal rights are extinguished and the now unprotected inventions are freely available 
for others to use and improve upon. 
Moreover, developing countries should be careful not to make the rights too strong until their 
economies are more advanced. Historical evidence indicates that several present-day developed 
countries, rightly or wrongly, took such a policy decision in the past.
Relationship Between Patents and Utility Models
The term utility model is bandied about by policy makers, legislators and jurists to refer to a second 
tier patent system, offering a cheap, no-examination protection regime for technical inventions 
which would not usually fulfil the strict patentability criteria. Indeed, the utility model law is not 
a standard feature within the intellectual property regime of many states. Included amongst the 
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countries which do not have a utility model regime are significantly the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Canada. However, major industrial nations which have adopted the utility model 
regime include Japan, South Korea and Germany.
The rationale for utility models is tied closely to the patent system and its inability to extend 
legal rights to innovations or discoveries that fall short of the inventive step and/or novelty bars. 
That is to say, limits are placed on the extent to which patent law will embrace inventive activity: 
only inventions which fulfil certain criteria will be protected, and adjunct to this axiom is the 
examination procedure which seeks to ensure that the patent system is not abused by the assertion 
of patents on spurious inventions. 
The question then arises, should we leave such innovations or discoveries unprotected, lower the 
bars to incorporate them into patent law, or seek an alternative means of protection? 
Weighing the Pros and Cons of the Utility Model Regime 
It may, on the other hand, be argued that the rationale for utility model systems is inherently 
unsound. Objections relate to the fact that in essence, the choices facing policymakers in respect 
of subpatentable inventions are far from straightforward. 
Questions for governments are:
— Should we leave sub-patentable inventions unprotected? [sub-patentable meaning those 
inventions which show little or no inventiveness]
— Should we lower the inventive step threshold under the standard patent law so that 
more inventions, including minor sub-patentable innovations, become patentable?
— Should we seek to create alternative legal means of protection such as a tort or 
misappropriation law, or a hybrid property rights system such as design rights?
There are more fundamental problems with utility models as a policy solution to the question of 
what, if anything, should be done about subpatentable inventions. 
(i) Uncertainty and unfairness 
First, the fact that the utility model regime encourages a lowering of thresholds without an 
appropriate examination system in place may result in legal uncertainty and excessive litigation. 
There is a reasonable concern that larger market players may use utility models as a means of 
circumventing the more stringent criteria under the patent system and overuse the system in ways 
that make it hard for SMEs to compete. Certainly, the lack of substantive examination prior to grant 
will give rise to uncertainty for third parties when conducting infringement searches to ascertain 
what valid rights exist in a particular field of technology, which may act as an additional barrier to 
competitors.
(ii)  Is copying good or bad?
Secondly, hybrid systems like utility models tend to rely extensively on the argument that cumulative 
innovations are vulnerable to unfair copying which should not be allowed. This argument is anchored 
to the classical natural rights justification of the intellectual property regime, that protection 
is conferred in order to enable inventors and creators to reap their just rewards by preventing 
misappropriation. Hence, such innovations should be protected. Moreover, it is traditionally thought 
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that protection against misappropriation is important to SMEs to encourage small-scale innovations 
(this is discussed below) 
However, herein lies a danger. Intellectual property rights are predicated on the notion that 
inventions and creative works are in the public domain except such works that fulfil the traditional 
standards of novelty, inventive step, originality or distinctiveness. If we provide second and third-
tier rights for inventions and works that fail to meet these standards, thereby allowing insufficiently 
inventive or original works to get protection by the back door, we undermine both the public-private 
boundary and the integrity of existing IPRs and their doctrines. 
Indeed, as some courts and jurists have argued, copying and free riding is necessary, if not beneficial, 
for competition. Imitation is an essential stage in learning to innovate and can even be creative in 
itself. 
(iii)  Practical and economic benefits 
• Utility model law may encourage local innovation so that local industries produce more goods
• Utility model law can protect valuable inventions which would otherwise not be protected 
under the standard patent law or other intellectual property laws
• This type of protection prevents free-riding of inventions by other predatory firms which expend 
no R&D costs or investment
• Utility model law can provide revenue to governments in the form of registration, search, 
publication, etc. fees
• Registered utility model rights can act as a source of valuable information via published 
specifications
• The existence of a utility model system may reduce incentives for industry to lobby for the 
inclusion of minor inventions in the patent regime; this in turn would limit the public domain 
much more than the less expansive utility model system (shorter terms of protection and 
exclusivity)
(iv)  Costs and disadvantages 
• The system may result in more and wider protection of inventions which could lead to an 
increase in spurious and wasteful claims and litigation
• This law may lead to economic rent-seeking behaviour by companies i.e. a company re-directs 
funds away from innovation or marketing to obtaining more property rights via utility model 
protection 
• The utility model system may be more utilised by foreign companies rather than local firms, 
in which case there is a possibility that this will lead to an increase in a flow of royalties and 
licensing fees to overseas producers 1
• Utility model rights can be, and have been, used by companies to cordon off areas of 
research 
Empirical Experiences of Other Countries
One must be cautious about gleaning too firm conclusions from those countries where businesses 
have had decades of experience in operating in a utility model climate. Moreover, one should be 
doubly cautious as to how statistics can be interpreted. Figures on the usage of the utility model 
system show that the utility model system works well in China, South Korea and Taiwan, Province 
of China and, until recently, in Japan. However, statistics can also be used to draw conflicting 
conclusions. This is a similar problem to that faced when using patent figures to measure technology 
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and innovation - reports on statistic usages suggest that the policy lessons that can be drawn from 
patent statistics are widely divergent.2 
Here is a short overview of the different experiences from different regions (more is elaborated in 
specific chapters):
— In the East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, a 
combination of relatively weak IPR protection and the availability of second-tier patents like 
utility models and design patents encouraged technological learning. The weak IPRs helped 
by allowing for local absorption of foreign innovations. The second-tier systems encouraged 
minor adaptations and inventions by local firms. Later on, the IP systems became stronger 
partly because local technological capacity was sufficiently advanced to generate a significant 
amount of innovation, and also as a result of international pressure.
 — India’s experience is somewhat similar, except that no second-tier protection was provided. 
This did not hurt the chemical or pharmaceutical industries, but may, it is suggested, have 
hindered the development of innovative engineering industries.
— In the European Union, the perception was that perhaps there was a need for utility model law 
throughout the region to specifically protect minor innovations in the following industries: toy 
manufacturing, clock and watchmaking, optics, microtechnology and micromechanics.
— In Germany, there was no coherent industrial property policy until the late nineteenth century 
when the first patent law in the German Reich was introduced in 1877, and utility model in 
1891. Part of the reason for this push for industrial property protection was the change in the 
economic landscape of Germany. German territories, especially Prussian ones, were agrarian 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Between 1850 and 1870, however, Germany was 
industrializing rapidly and industrial leaders such as the Siemens firm organized pro-patent 
lobbies. Utility model law was first introduced in 1891 because it was thought that patent 
law was not suitable for all types of inventions. The important factor to remember is that the 
German local market is used to the utility model system and there is knowledge about it. 
— The utility model system in the United Kingdom faltered as it did not have the support of the 
main lobbying force in relation to patent reform. Nineteenth century patent agents were not 
keen to reform the existing patent regime; neither, however, were they keen to introduce a 
new registration system which may have undermined their existing stronghold under the patent 
law. Importing a utility model law to a developing country would require educating the local 
industrial users as well as the patent community. This is clear from the historical experience of 
the utility model system in the UK.
Conclusions: Policy Considerations & Future Agendas for Developing Countries
The fundamental precondition for a decision on whether or not to adopt utility model protection is 
that developing countries must map out and evaluate their own industrial and innovation base, and 
identify its current and long term economic requirements. The following points elaborate what type 
of specific considerations and questions need to be asked.
(i)  Importer nations. 
There is a growing perception within those countries which are heavy intellectual property importers 
as opposed to exporters that there is a need for a second tier patent regime. It is perceived that this 
problem arises with the patent law’s inability to cope with an innovative environment dominated by 
local incremental inventions. Consequently much of the rationale in pursuing a second tier patent 
law is grounded in the fact that the second tier system may respond to or avoid the shortcomings 
of the patent law in fostering local innovation. 
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The key questions are:
— Is the country a net importer or exporter of I.P. goods? 
— Is there a need to limit imports of foreign goods by encouraging the local industrial 
base?
(ii)  Unfair competition and other alternative IPRs systems 
The underlying rationale for utility model rights, in practical and policy terms in many countries, is 
that these rights are there due to industries’ lobbying for an anti-copying right or a misappropriation 
tort rather than as a spur to local innovation. Indeed, the main practical justification derives 
from the fact that many inventions are vulnerable to unfair copying and that in many cases the 
subpatentable ones are the most vulnerable of all. If one accepts the “unfair copying” argument 
favouring IP protection, it follows that any subject matter which is open to imitation and copying, 
should be considered worthy of intellectual property protection. However, whilst some industries 
tend to be very enthusiastic about low cost, fast protection regimes, other industries are highly 
suspicious of such systems, especially when they are viewed as curtailing industries’ right to innovate 
on the basis of “creative imitation” and access to a large public domain. 
The key questions are:
— To what extent is copying a problem in the country, and which types of industries are 
facing this problem?
— Are such inventions better left in the public domain and open to imitation, adaptation 
and incremental improvement? 
— Is there an economic argument as to why such inventions should be protected (e.g. the 
importance of maintaining or encouraging or developing a particular industry)?
Note that “inventions” are sometimes looked upon by courts and industries as “three-dimensional 
products”.
Further queries are:
— If there is a need for a quick, cheap and efficient protection regime, should it be a non-
registration or registration system?
— Are there already alternative forms of protection in the country which is being offered to 
such inventions such as trade mark laws, unregistered design rights, unfair competition 
and registered design laws?
(iii)  Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
It is often claimed that utility model systems are particularly advantageous for SMEs, especially in 
developing countries. It is quite likely that SMEs have a large presence in those industries where 
cumulative innovation is the norm and copying is rife. Indeed, it is also often argued that a cheap 
and rapid second tier patent regime would improve the legal environment for SMEs, especially those 
which are engaged in an ongoing process of innovation and adaptation. This is more so in relation 
to certain product sectors which are concerned, not so much with revolutionary technological 
breakthroughs, but more so with incremental or improvement innovation. For another, it may even 
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be that more innovations, both of the breakthrough and incremental varieties, emanate from SMEs 
than from larger multinational conglomerates. If this is so, it is important to gauge whether the 
current patent regime is attuned to the needs of SMEs and the types of inventions they produce. 
Another reason why utility models may be good for SMEs is that the cost factor may inhibit them 
from using the patent system as much as they would desire. 
The key questions are:
— What is the percentage of SMEs within the region? 
— How much innovation, which is important to that region’s economy, emanates from 
these SMEs?
— What type of innovation is being produced? 
— Is the current patent regime suited to their needs in terms of criteria of protection, costs 
and ease of use?
(iv)  Historical and economic climate of a country 
The discussion above in respect of the empirical findings of certain countries suggest also 
that sometimes the decision whether utility model can only be made if the following 
questions are answered:
— What sort of development and innovation is being encouraged by the government? 
— If the country’s strength lies in the chemical or pharmaceutical industries, is there really 
a need for a utility model system?
— Alternatively, if the strength lies in minor innovation in engineering or optical technologies, 
will the utility model system spur or maintain economic growth?
(v)  Specific policy considerations for governments 
Intellectual property systems are more than just pieces of legislation, and may best be viewed 
as public policy regulatory institutions. As such, they consist of the relevant statutes, rules and 
regulations plus the government agencies, courts and professional people involved in interpretation, 
implementation, enforcement and reform. Importing the utility model system to a developing 
country would require educating the local industrial users as well as the patent community. 
Does the government have resources to create the right type of “intellectual property 
institutional order” which will support the utility model systems?
(vi)  The options 
There are three options which a developing country can consider:
• Status quo approach - A developing country can accept the existing intellectual property 
regime, without introducing any new right.
• Accretion approach - A developing country can adjust the existing intellectual property regime 
without introducing a utility model right. This can be done by extending existing intellectual 
property rights to new subject matter (such as sub patentable or functional innovation) by re-
defining an existing right to encompass the new material.
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• Emulation approach - Emulation involves creating new hybrid rights. If a developing country 
does not have such a right, it would be the most expensive option in the short run. However, 
this expense is an immediate real cost which may be offset by long term benefits to the 
industrial environment such as increased international licensing opportunities.
(vii)  The ideal 
Should it still be felt that policy considerations necessitate the introduction of a utility model system 
in a particular country, it is recommended that the following essential features be considered: 
• A renewal based term of protection, with renewal and tiered fees
• A non-examination system for the first term of protection, followed by a compulsory examination/
report for the second stage of protection
• A compulsory examination / report when invalidation/infringement proceedings
• Universal novelty standard be adopted
• Government action to increase awareness of utility model protection
• Cross-licensing/compulsory licensing 
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1  INNOVATION AND THE NATURE OF UTILITY MODEL LAW
1.1	 Utility	Models	in	the	World
1.1.1  What is a utility model? 
There is no global acceptance of the 
term “utility model” due to there being 
fundamentally different concepts from one 
country to another. If one examines national 
laws, one finds that utility model protection is 
referred to in Australia as “innovation patent”, 
in Malaysia as “utility innovation”, in France as 
“utility certificate”, and in Belgium as “short-
term patent”. Some systems define utility 
models as intangible subject matter such as 
technical concepts or inventions or devices, 
while others anchor their definitions to three-
dimensional forms. Yet others profess to grant 
“utility model” protection which, in actuality, 
is equivalent to patent protection without 
examination and for a shorter duration. Thus, 
“utility model” is a generic term which refers 
to subject-matter that hinges precariously 
between that protectable under patent law and 
sui generis design law.3 It is not an accepted 
or clearly defined legal concept within the 
intellectual property paradigm. 
The confusion reflects the fact that within 
the international arena, a consideration of 
the nature and extent of protection under the 
various national “utility model” laws reveals 
little consensus. Indeed, the utility model law 
is not a standard feature within the intellectual 
property regime of many states. There are 
currently approximately 75 countries which 
provide, in some form or another, utility model 
protection.4 Included amongst the countries 
which do not have a utility model regime are 
significantly the United States, United Kingdom 
and Canada. However, major industrial nations 
which have adopted the utility model regime 
include Japan, South Korea and Germany.
The ambiguity of the term “utility model” is 
also reflected in the cross-referencing and 
inter-dependency of priority periods between 
utility model, industrial design and patents. 
Thus, a period of priority can be secured for 
an application for industrial design based on 
the filing date of a utility model; and a period 
of priority can be secured for a utility model 
application by virtue of a right of priority based 
on a patent application (and vice versa).5 Whilst 
there is no specific reference to utility model 
protection under the TRIPS Agreement, it is 
arguable that by reference to Art. 2(1), TRIPS 
Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Paris 
Convention provisions (including Art. 1(2)) are 
extended to all WTO countries. However, we 
are once again left with our initial position: 
the Paris Convention does not demand that 
signatories of the Convention implement utility 
model laws.
Nevertheless, the term is bandied about by 
policy makers, legislators and jurists to refer 
to a second tier patent system, offering a 
cheap, no-examination protection regime for 
technical inventions which would not usually 
fulfil the strict patentability criteria. This is 
an important factor: utility model protection 
is accorded, cheaply and quickly, to inventions 
or innovations, many of which cannot gain 
protection under the patent regime. As far as 
one can perceive, there are three traits common 
to all the national “utility model” laws from a 
global perspective, which are that: 
• all utility model laws confer exclusive 
rights on the proprietor of the right (as 
opposed to an anti-copying right)
• novelty is a criterion in all utility model 
systems, though the standard of novelty 
varies widely.6 
• registration is a requirement but that 
usually there is no substantive examination 
of applications.
• most utility model laws protect the 
technical character of the invention, as 
opposed to the ornamental function or the 
appearance of the product.7
The major points of divergence can be 
summarised thus:
• Subject matter under protection: Some 
utility model laws protect only the three-
dimensional form while others extend 
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the umbrella of protection to cover 
technical inventions and processes. A 
majority of utility model laws simply 
adopt the domestic patent law definition 
of protectable subject matter. 
• Granting procedure: Many systems adopt a 
simple registration procedure with cursory 
examination; while a few implement 
a detailed examination process. In 
practice, some examining offices offer an 
optional detailed search facility with the 
payment of supplementary fees. Other 
jurisdictions expressly call for a detailed 
search on validity to be carried out on the 
commencement of civil proceedings. 
• Substantive criteria: Herein lies the 
greatest disparity between the utility 
model systems. While all major utility 
model systems adopt the criterion of 
novelty, the level of novelty required ranges 
from universal novelty, to relative novelty, 
to domestic novelty. A second criterion is 
usually, though not always, imposed in the 
form of inventiveness or usefulness. Again, 
the standard employed for the level of 
inventiveness varies greatly. There is also a 
significant propensity within current utility 
model laws to link the definition of the 
utility model to an element of industrial 
application. 
• Duration of protection: A final element of 
divergence is the duration of protection 
which varies from six years to twenty five 
years.
1.1.2  Overview of Different 
Systems 
Many supporters of utility models consider 
them to be especially beneficial for relatively 
innovative developing countries that are 
seeking to advance their technological 
capacities through local innovation by SMEs. 
A quick overview of some of the developing 
nations in the Central Asian and Asia-Pacific 
regions in Table A (see annex) reveals that the 
utility model law is a popular option in the 
Asian region. The table also reveals that most 
of these laws vary greatly, especially in relation 
to the types of subject matter protected, the 
level of novelty, the requirement of inventive 
step, and finally the availability of requesting 
a substantial examination report. This is not 
surprising considering the lack of international 
guidance on this matter.
Some attempt has been made to offer a 
harmonised regime within the Latin American 
region. The Andean Community Decision 
486 of 2000 establishes a Common Regime 
on Industrial Property for its five member 
countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela), and although the Decision does not 
create a unitary utility model regime, it does 
define the standard that must be adopted by 
each member. Accordingly, a utility model is 
considered to be a “new form, configuration, 
disposition of elements, of any artefact, tool, 
instrument, mechanism or other object or 
any part of the same, that permits a better or 
different functioning, use or manufacture of the 
object which incorporates or which offers any 
use, advantage or technical effect that it did 
not have previously.” The term of protection 
is ten years from the filing date. Utility model 
applications can be converted upon request to 
patent applications as well as vice versa.8
An attempt has been made to create a unitary In 
relation to the African region, there is a unitary 
Annex II of the 1999 Revised Bangui Agreement 
of March 2, 1977, on the Creation of an African 
Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) is 
much more detailed than the utility model 
provisions of the Andean Community Decision 
486. It also establishes unitary IP systems so 
that rights granted have automatic effect in the 
territories of every member state, albeit subject 
to the relevant countries’ national legislation. 
Accordingly, protected utility models “shall be 
implements of work or objects to be utilized or 
parts of such implements or objects in so far 
as they are useful for the work or employment 
for which they are intended on account of a 
new configuration, a new arrangement or a 
new component device, and are industrially 
applicable.” Novelty is territorial so that an 
application would fail only if the implement 
or object had already been publicly used or 
disclosed in print in the territory of a member 
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country. The term of protection is ten years 
from filing date. As in the Andean Community 
countries, utility model applications can be 
converted upon request to patent applications 
as well as vice versa. Searches are carried out 
for novelty and industrial applicability. There is 
also an examination of applications to ensure 
that the subject matter does not fall under the 
stated exclusions, that the applications are 
“restricted to a single principle subject”, and 
that “the claim or claims defining the scope of 
the protection sought” do “not go beyond the 
contents of the description”. 
The African Regional Industrial Property 
Organization Protocol on Patents and 
Industrial Designs (Harare Protocol)9 defines 
utility models as “any form, configuration or 
disposition of elements of some appliance, 
working tools and implements as articles 
of everyday use, electrical and electronic 
circuitry or other object or part thereof in 
so far as they are capable of contributing 
some benefit or new effect or saving in time, 
energy, or labour or improving the hygienic or 
sociophysiological working conditions by means 
of new configuration, arrangement or device 
or a combination thereof and are industrially 
applicable.” The Office carries out a substantive 
examination of applications for novelty and 
industrial application. Utility models need only 
be new in the designated countries. Again, 
applications can be converted upon request to 
patent applications as well as vice versa.
1.2	 Utility	Models	in	
International	and	
Multilateral	Agreements
1.2.1  Paris Convention
On the international front, utility models are 
recognised under the Paris Convention as industrial 
property. However the Convention is silent as to 
its definition and scope, and merely confirms that 
the international principles of national treatment 
and the right of priority is accorded to utility 
models.10  Thus, Article 1(2) states:
The protection of industrial property has as its 
object patents, utility models, industrial designs, 
trade marks, service marks, trade names, 
indications of source or appellations of origin, 
and the repression of unfair competition.11
The ambiguity of the term “utility model” is 
also reflected in the cross-referencing and 
inter-dependency of priority periods between 
utility model, industrial design and patents. 
Thus, a period of priority can be secured for 
an application for industrial design based on 
the filing date of a utility model; and a period 
of priority can be secured for a utility model 
application by virtue of a right of priority based 
on a patent application (and vice versa).12  
1.2.2  The TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement13 establishes minimum 
substantive standards for each of the major 
intellectual property regimes but fails 
explicitly to mention second tier or utility 
model protection, thus leaving WTO member 
countries free to formulate or reject second 
tier protection regimes as they see fit. Whilst 
there is no specific reference to utility model 
protection under the TRIPS Agreement, it is 
arguable that by reference to Article 2(1), TRIPS 
Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Paris 
Convention provisions (including Article 1(2)) 
are extended to all WTO countries. But this 
still does not require World Trade Organization 
members or signatories to the Convention to 
provide utility model laws.14 
1.2.3  Other Patent Treaties and 
Agreements 
National utility model systems tend to adopt 
the International Patent Classification (IPC) as 
provided by the 1971 Strasbourg Agreement for 
the International Patent Classification, which 
facilitates the retrieval of patent documents in 
order to conduct effective novelty searches and 
determine the state of the art. Indeed, Article 
1 states that the IPC covers not just “patents 
for invention”, but also “inventors’ certificates, 
utility models and utility certificates”. 
Another significant agreement is the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), the purpose of which 
is to facilitate patent applications in more than 
one country. By simplifying and cheapening the 
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process, the treaty encourages patentees to 
secure protection over a broader geographical 
range. Instead of filing separately in all countries 
where protection is desired, applicants may 
file a single application in one language with a 
national patent office. When doing so they can 
designate all those signatory countries in which 
protection is also sought. After the examination 
of the patent, the application is transferred to 
one of nine International Search Authorities 
where a prior art search is conducted.  After 
this it is then up to the patent offices of – or 
acting for – the designated countries to award 
the patent. 
The facilitated means of securing international 
protection that the PCT provides for patents 
covers utility models as well. By virtue of 
Article 2, the PCT clarifies that ‘“application” 
means an application for the protection of an 
invention; references to an “application” shall 
be construed as references to applications for 
patents for inventions, inventors’ certificates, 
utility certificates, utility models, patents or 
certificates of addition, inventors’ certificates 
of addition, and utility certificates of addition”. 
In short, then, international applications may 
be for second-tier patents as well as standard 
ones. 
1.3	 Theoretical	and	Policy-
related	Justifications	for	
Utility	Models
1.3.1 History, economics and 
policy of intellectual property 
IPRs ostensibly exist primarily to benefit society. 
But this does not tell us much about the ends 
they are meant to serve nor how these ends 
ought to be achieved. 
The rationale for utility models is tied closely 
to the patent system and its inability to extend 
legal rights to innovations or discoveries that 
fall short of the inventive step and/or novelty 
bars. That is to say, limits are placed on the 
extent to which patent law will embrace 
inventive activity: only inventions which fulfil 
certain criteria will be protected, and adjunct 
to this axiom is the examination procedure 
which seeks to ensure that the patent system 
is not abused by the assertion of patents on 
spurious inventions. The question then arises, 
should we leave such innovations or discoveries 
unprotected, lower the bars to incorporate 
them into patent law, or seek an alternative 
means of protection? 
The origins of patent protection justifications 
lie in the ancient European state privileges 
which granted an exclusive right with the 
aim of encouraging domestic innovation and 
exploitation of technology – indeed, “inventive 
activity” was not a necessary requirement 
as the value lay in the dissemination of the 
teachings inherent in the patented technology.15 
Furthermore, the prevailing mercantilist 
ethos of the time accepted the principle 
that a system of exclusive privileges would 
nurture innovative activity which would, in 
turn, promote the economic well-being of the 
country. The mercantilist regarded the state 
as the appropriate instrument for promoting 
the well-being of his country: in his view the 
country was regarded as a unit with national 
interests, irrespective of the interest of 
particular sections of individuals. In accordance 
with this, the state harnessed and controlled 
resources, skills and products for the purposes 
and profit of the state. Patent privileges were 
merely one species in the genus of privileges, 
charters, franchises, licences and regulations 
issued by the Crown or by local governments 
within the mercantilist framework.16 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
general consensus, encouraged by Adam Smith 
and Jeremy Bentham,17 was that the existence 
of the patent regime was justified on the basis 
of the reward theory. J. S. Mill summarised this 
view: 
“The condemnation of monopolies ought 
not to extend to patents, by which the 
originator of an improved process is 
allowed to enjoy, for a limited period, 
the exclusive privilege of using his own 
improvement. This is not making the 
commodity dear for his benefit, but 
merely postponing a part of the increased 
cheapness which the public owe to the 
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inventor, in order to compensate and 
reward him for the service. That he ought 
to be both compensated and rewarded 
for it, will not be denied.”18 
The revised current theory is that patents 
are tools for economic advancement that 
should contribute to the enrichment of society 
through (i) the widest possible availability of 
new and useful goods, services and technical 
information that derive from inventive activity, 
and (ii) the highest possible level of economic 
activity based on the production, circulation 
and further development of such goods, 
services and information. One common way 
to interpret the modern patent system is as a 
regulatory response to the failure of the free 
market to achieve optimal resource allocation 
for invention. Once patent rights have been 
acquired, the owners seek to exploit them in 
the market-place. The possibility of attaining 
commercial benefits, it is believed, encourages 
innovation. But, after a certain period of time, 
these legal rights are extinguished and the now 
unprotected inventions are freely available for 
others to use and improve upon. 
Patents are necessarily temporary exclusionary 
rights. As Geroski puts it, 
“patents are designed to create a market 
for knowledge by assigning propriety 
rights to innovators which enable 
them to overcome the problem of non-
excludability while, at the same time, 
encouraging the maximum diffusion of 
knowledge by making it public”.19 
Such rights can be converted into market 
monopolies if the invention so protected 
results in a commercial product and depending 
on certain factors such as the relationship 
between the invention and the product, which 
may actually be protected by more than one 
patent. The public goods explanation for patents 
posits that the possibility of acquiring such 
rights encourages both investment in invention 
and the research and development needed to 
turn inventions into marketable innovations. 
Information about the invention as revealed in 
the patent and by the invention itself is diffused 
throughout the economy. In this context, it is 
helpful to conceive of a patent as a contract 
between the holder and the government on 
behalf of the citizenry. The holder receives 
an exclusive right over his or her invention in 
exchange for the payment of fees and – which 
is much more important – for disclosing the 
invention for others to learn from. Without a 
patent, the inventor would have no incentive 
to disclose it. This would be a loss for society 
if such lack of protection left the inventor 
with no alternative but to keep it secret. Such 
an alternative is a feasible option in several 
technological fields including biotechnology. 
But it is also true that many kinds of product 
would upon examination readily betray the 
invention that brought it into existence.
As for the creation of markets for knowledge, 
it might be useful here to explain why these 
are considered beneficial and how patents 
are thought to bring them into being. The 
explanation relates to the common situation 
that many patent holders are poorly placed 
to exploit their invention in the marketplace. 
Take the case of a creative but small company 
lacking the funds to develop and commercialise 
new products based upon its inventions. If such 
products are desirable for consumers, failure 
to commercialize would be a loss for society. 
But if the company owns a patent, a wealthier 
company may wish to license or buy the patent 
secure in the knowledge that the invention is 
legally protected. And if the invention were 
kept secret, how would bigger companies know 
about it? The disclosure of patent information 
makes it possible for prospective users to find 
inventions of interest and then to approach 
their owners.
1.3.2  Follow-on innovation and the 
public domain 
The “market failure” argument should not be 
carried to logical absurdities and countries 
should not accept that it is necessary to 
allocate property rights on every intellectual 
output of the creator. Not everything created 
under the sun must be awarded intellectual 
property protection. Limits have to be placed 
on the exact breadth of patent protection of 
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innovations, and countries should take note as 
to the effects of widening the current patent 
regime. In some instances, intellectual property 
rights can reach untenable levels whereby 
the intellectual property owner becomes a 
monopolist of discoveries or ideas, as opposed 
to “inventions”. For example, if we were to 
allow every idea or discovery to be claimed and 
to be exhaustively protected under intellectual 
property rights, what of the future generations 
of inventors who would need to use such basic 
building blocks for further innovative activities? 
In such an instance, they would either have 
to incur licensing or other transaction costs 
to obtain permission to use these building 
blocks, or else they may attempt to work 
around the problem by attempting to disguise 
any appropriation of such blocks, incurring a 
potential cost of litigation. The final recourse 
would be to work around the protected building 
blocks and incur costly research. The costs of 
creating a new invention would increase, with 
detrimental effects. If patent protection were 
structured in such a manner as to require the 
sacrifice of scarce resources, any societal 
benefits and economic rent accruing from a 
patent regime would be dissipated. These 
arguments are also the basis upon which a high 
level of inventiveness is required under patent 
law to ensure that commonplace, obvious or 
mere workshop inventions are not protected.
Thus, excessive protection will act as a 
disincentive to future creators and certain 
types of basic building blocks of creativity must 
be left in the public domain. Where the line 
between the private and the public domains 
should be drawn is very difficult to determine 
but its ideal location will vary widely from one 
country to another, and, one may argue from 
one business sector to another. In countries 
where little inventive activity takes place, free 
access to technical information may well do 
more to foster technological capacity building 
than providing strong private rights over such 
information. In fact, technological capacity 
building may at certain stages of national 
development be best achieved by requiring 
foreign technology holders to transfer their 
technologies on generous terms rather than 
by trying to encourage domestic innovation by 
making strong legal rights available to all.20 This 
suggests that developing countries should be 
careful not to make the rights too strong until 
their economies are more advanced. Historical 
evidence indicates that several present-day 
developed countries, rightly or wrongly, took 
such a policy decision in the past.
1.3.3 Utility models: theoretical 
and practical considerations
Utility models can thus be justified on both 
theoretical and practical grounds and these 
are closely related. The theoretical rationale 
for utility models derives from the facts that 
most social welfare-enhancing inventions are 
cumulative in nature and that a great deal of 
them are subpatentable in the sense that the 
novelty and inventive step requirements are 
too high for the patent system to accommodate 
them. In fact, in today’s industrial society 
different levels of innovative activity apply 
in different areas. Major technological 
breakthroughs may be more common in some 
industrial sectors (e.g. biotechnology and ICT) 
than others (e.g. electronics), but are hardly 
everyday occurrences in any of them. 
(i)  Importer or exporter of 
intellectual property products? 
There is an accepted view within some 
industrialised nations that there is a need for 
a second tier patent regime. This view is being 
increasingly accepted within other nations too, 
especially those countries which are heavy 
intellectual property importers as opposed to 
exporters and where patent law’s inability to 
cope with an innovative environment dominated 
by local incremental inventions may be seen as 
constituting a major deficiency. Consequently, 
much of the rationale in pursuing a second tier 
patent law is grounded in the fact that the 
second tier system may respond to or avoid 
the shortcomings of the patent law in fostering 
local innovation. 
(ii)  Copying: creative imitation or 
misappropriation 
However, although utility model laws confer 
exclusive property rights, the underlying 
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rationale is usually to accede to industries’ call 
for an anti-copying right or a misappropriation 
tort rather than as a spur to local innovation. 
Indeed, the main practical justification 
derives from the fact that many inventions are 
vulnerable to unfair copying and that in many 
cases the subpatentable ones are the most 
vulnerable of all. If one accepts the “unfair 
copying” argument favouring IP protection, it 
follows that any subject matter evincing some 
sort of intellectual or capital investment, and 
which is open to imitation and copying, should 
be considered a worthy intellectual property 
good requiring protection. Indeed, some 
products, once invented and marketed, 
are especially susceptible to being copied 
at negligible or zero cost. Often, these 
products come from industries whose 
innovations tend to be small, incremental 
and cumulative in character. Evidently, it 
is for these industries that a utility model 
system is likely to be most beneficial.
However, whilst some industries tend to be very 
enthusiastic about low cost, fast protection 
regimes (such as a no-examination utility 
model system or a no-registration property 
right), other industries are highly suspicious of 
such systems, especially when they are viewed 
as curtailing industries’ right to innovate on 
the basis of “creative imitation” and access 
to a large public domain. So one really needs 
to know to what extent copying is a problem 
in the different industries, and whether 
such inventions are better left in the public 
domain and open to imitation, adaptation and 
incremental improvement. 
(iii)  Nature of innovator and 
innovation 
It is often claimed that utility model systems are 
particularly advantageous for SMEs, especially 
in developing countries. For one thing, it is 
quite likely that SMEs have a large presence in 
those industries where cumulative innovation is 
the norm and unfair copying is rife. Indeed, it 
is often argued that a cheap and rapid second 
tier patent regime would improve the legal 
environment for SMEs, especially those which 
are engaged in an ongoing process of innovation 
and adaptation. This is more so in relation to 
certain product sectors which are concerned, 
not so much with revolutionary technological 
breakthroughs, but more so with incremental 
or improvement innovation. For example, one 
reason for the draft European Commission 
Directive is the perceived need for a rapid 
and cheap protective regime for such minor 
innovations in the following industries: toy 
manufacturing, clock and watchmaking, optics, 
microtechnology and micromechanics.
For another, it may even be that more 
innovations, both of the breakthrough and 
incremental varieties, emanate from SMEs than 
from larger multinational conglomerates. If 
this is so, it is important to gauge whether the 
current patent regime is attuned to the needs of 
SMEs and the types of inventions they produce. 
Many inventions which originate in SMEs have 
a lower standard of inventiveness, and are 
prime candidates for free riding activities by 
competitors. Consequently, utility models may 
be highly pro-innovation and consequently good 
for the national economy.
Another reason why utility models may be good 
for SMEs is that the cost factor may inhibit them 
from using the patent system as much as they 
would desire. The second tier patent regime is 
viewed as the ideal solution as it is a system 
geared towards the needs of SMEs, including in 
terms of cost. 
1.3.4 Policy considerations for 
governments 
(i)  The right type of “intellectual 
property institutional order”?
Intellectual property systems are more than 
just pieces of legislation, and may best be 
viewed as public policy regulatory institutions. 
As such, they consist of the relevant statutes, 
rules and regulations plus the government 
agencies, courts and professional people 
involved in interpretation, implementation, 
enforcement and reform. Institutions are not 
static but evolve over time, and they operate in 
different ways according to the context. Thus, 
they may be appropriate and functional in one 
context but inappropriate and dysfunctional in 
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another, and it can be very difficult to predict 
how well such an institution transplanted to 
a completely different cultural, political or 
economic milieu will work in practice. History 
can offer some pointers, or can at least help 
us to reflect on the likely preconditions for a 
successful transplantation. 
(ii)  Development and innovation
As mentioned above, there is a view that 
utility models are especially good for relatively 
innovative developing countries seeking to 
advance technological capacity through local 
incremental innovation. For example, Juma 
put forward five reasons why utility models are 
appropriate for such nations.21 The first is that 
they enable artisans to secure protection for 
innovations that do not meet the stricter novelty 
and inventive step requirements of patent law. 
Second, they make it possible to increase the 
role of small-scale innovators and artisans in 
economic development and help them stay in 
business in the face of new technologies that 
might threaten their livelihoods. Third, they 
act as a spur to enhanced levels of innovation. 
Fourth, they are cheaper to acquire than 
patents. And finally, they may become a source 
of data on innovative activity and experience in 
technological management.
As for empirical evidence, Kumar22 found that 
in the East Asian countries he studied (i.e. 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Province of 
China), a combination of relatively weak IPR 
protection and the availability of second-tier 
patents like utility models and design patents 
encouraged technological learning. The weak 
IPRs helped by allowing for local absorption of 
foreign innovations. The second-tier systems 
encouraged minor adaptations and inventions 
by local firms. Later on, the IP systems became 
stronger partly because local technological 
capacity was sufficiently advanced to generate 
a significant amount of innovation, and also 
as a result of international pressure. India’s 
experience is somewhat similar, except that 
no second-tier protection was provided. This 
did not hurt the chemical or pharmaceutical 
industries, but may, he suggests, have hindered 
the development of innovative engineering 
industries.
1.3.5 Possible objections
It may, on the other hand, also be argued that the 
rationale for utility model systems is inherently 
unsound. Objections relate to the fact that in 
essence, the choices facing policymakers in 
respect of subpatentable inventions are far 
from straightforward. They may choose to leave 
them unprotected, to lower the inventive step 
threshold so that they become patentable, or 
they may seek to create alternative legal means 
of protection. Alternatives include introducing 
a liability rule-based system such as a statute 
based tort or misappropriation law, or a hybrid 
property rights system such as industrial design 
rights or utility models. These systems could 
operate in place of patents or copyright, as the 
case may be, or could alternatively operate in 
parallel, so that patents and copyright could 
then be used only for those inventions and 
creative works displaying a demonstrably high 
inventive step or level of originality. 
But there are fundamental problems with 
utility models as a policy solution to the 
question of what, if anything, should be done 
about subpatentable inventions. First, the fact 
that the utility model regime encourages a 
lowering of thresholds without an appropriate 
examination system in place may result in legal 
uncertainty and excessive litigation. Indeed, 
there is a reasonable concern that larger market 
players may use utility models as a means of 
circumventing the more stringent criteria under 
the patent system and overuse the system in 
ways that make it hard for SMEs to compete. 
Certainly, the lack of substantive examination 
prior to grant will give rise to uncertainty for 
third parties when conducting infringement 
searches to ascertain what valid rights exist in 
a particular field of technology, which may act 
as an additional barrier to competitors.
It is difficult to test the validity of such a concern, 
but it is noteworthy that a survey carried out 
on behalf of the European Commission in 1993 
found that on average 50 percent of industry in 
the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy and 
Germany was “partly to greatly dissatisfied 
by the application of the utility model system 
in Europe at present” with the satisfaction 
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being greater amongst SMEs. The causes of this 
dissatisfaction were not totally specified but 
the fact that different standards exist between 
various countries was clearly a contributing 
factor in addition to any discontent that might 
exist about the specific features of protection 
in any particular country. Thus, 76 percent of 
the SMEs surveyed expressed a high interest 
in the adoption of a community wide utility 
model system whereas interest among larger 
companies was much smaller.
Secondly, hybrid systems like utility models 
tend to rely extensively on the argument that 
cumulative innovations are vulnerable to unfair 
copying which should not be allowed. This 
argument is anchored to the classical natural 
rights justification of the intellectual property 
regime, that protection is conferred in order to 
enable inventors and creators to reap their just 
rewards by preventing misappropriation. Hence, 
such innovations should be protected. However, 
herein lies a danger. Intellectual property rights 
are predicated on the notion that inventions 
and creative works are in the public domain 
except such works that fulfil the traditional 
standards of novelty, inventive step, originality 
or distinctiveness. If we provide second and 
third-tier rights for inventions and works that 
fail to meet these standards, thereby allowing 
insufficiently inventive or original works to get 
protection by the back door, we undermine both 
the public-private boundary and the integrity of 
existing IPRs and their doctrines.23 After all, in a 
market-based economy it is generally accepted 
that all market actors, including competitors, 
follow-on creators and consumers, should be 
allowed to freely use any work which falls short 
of the required standards. Indeed, as some 
courts and jurists have argued, copying and 
free riding is necessary, if not beneficial, for 
competition.24 Actually, imitation is an essential 
stage in learning to innovate and can even be 
creative in itself. Admittedly, anybody with the 
right equipment can copy a music CD and will 
learn very little by doing it. But copying a new 
medicine, especially a complex protein-based 
drug, is another story entirely. Indeed, some of 
the world’s most advanced companies learned 
to be creative after copying other people’s 
inventions first.25 
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2  THE EUROPEAN UNION
25 Member States, summarising the areas of 
strength and weakness in each Member State.26 
Countries which indicated innovation as one 
of their areas of strength included Finland, 
Denmark, Sweden and Germany. However 
when we cross-refer this data to availability 
of second tier patent systems, we find that 
Sweden has no second tier system, whilst utility 
model systems in Finland and Denmark are 
relatively new having been introduced in 1991 
and 1992 respectively.27 On the other hand, 
the survey identifies countries with relatively 
longer experience of utility model regimes such 
as Italy and Spain as having weak innovation 
systems.28
The European Innovation Scoreboard shows 
that the most innovative sector in the EU is 
electrical and optical equipment, followed 
by chemical and chemical products; the least 
innovative is textiles and textile products. 
Innovation in specific sectors tends to be 
Member State specific – thus, the electrical 
equipment sector is most innovative in Finland 
while Germany leads in transport equipment. 
Interestingly, one of the factors responsible for 
the European utility model proposal was the 
European Commission’s claim of a need for the 
protection of minor innovations by utility model 
in industries such as clock and watchmaking, 
optics, microtechnology and micromechanics. 
2.1.2 Standard patenting activity
Patent protection within the European Union is 
available either under national patent systems 
or under the European Patent Convention, 
with Member States’ patent laws being, to a 
certain extent, harmonised by the accession 
of all European Union States to the European 
Patent Convention. The European Patent 
Convention does not create a uniform right but 
it does provide the applicant with protection 
in as many of the Signatory States as he 
wishes, and rationalises the grant of patents in 
Europe by means of a centralised application 
and examination procedure managed by the 
European Patent Office in Munich. In this 
2.1	 Economic	and	Innovation	
Climate	Within	The	E.U.
Economic growth in the EU as a whole slowed 
markedly in 2000, with growth in several 
Member States having reached a standstill. 
During the 1990s, growth in production and 
in labour productivity in manufacturing in the 
EU was far below the rates recorded in the 
United States. During the 1990s, technology 
driven industries experienced the highest 
productivity growth in the EU, followed by 
capital-intensive industries. Evidence from 
the 1990s suggests that research intensity and 
productivity growth are significantly related 
across sectors, both in the United States and 
within the EU, though not in each Member 
State. Productivity growth in technology-
driven industries (for example, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, radio, 
TV and telephony equipment, motor vehicles, 
aircraft manufacturing, spacecraft, optical 
equipment), in the EU was faster in the second 
half of the 1990s than in the first. Other 
factors have also contributed to production and 
productivity growth, such as the capabilities of 
firms, the stock of knowledge and information 
communication technologies. Accumulation of 
these assets, many of which are intangible, 
often reflects strategic decisions on the part of 
businesses and constitutes the basis on which 
assets are built up in the future.  
2.1.1 Is there a link between 
innovation and utility model?
The EU is characterised by substantial 
regional diversity in wealth, and 
competitiveness conditions differ 
substantially across regions. There are 
substantial national differences in innovation 
performance. Variations between Member 
States are particularly high in relation to 
business R&D, high-tech patenting and the share 
of SMEs involved in co-operative innovation. 
The differences are greater in areas directly 
influenced by private decision making. In 2004, 
the European Commission published its summary 
of enterprise policy indicators in each of the 
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manner, the European Patent Convention fulfils 
the function of a harmonising patent regime 
within the European Union. 
If we look at the European Innovation Scoreboard 
2004, it indicates that there is an innovation 
gap between the United States and Japan, on 
the one hand, and the EU (as a whole) on the 
other.29 Although the EU innovation performance 
has been constant since 1996 and has not 
faltered, innovation performance in the United 
States and Japan has improved, thus widening 
the gap. An interesting element of the research 
is that the gap is explained away by comparing 
3 factors between the United States and the 
EU:
•	 Patents (50 percent of the gap)
•	 Working population with tertiary education 
(26 percent)
•	 R&D expenditures (11 percent) – mainly 
business R&D
Public sector spending on R&D is comparable in 
the EU, the United States and Japan. The various 
reports from the European Commission lament 
the fact that there is, despite the increase in 
business R&D in several EU Member States, a 
gap with the United States and Japan in respect 
of patenting. The major worry is that United 
States high-tech patenting in Europe is about 
seven times higher than European patenting in 
the United States; the situation with Japan is 
almost as unbalanced, with a strong position 
of Japanese high-tech patenting in the United 
States.30 This is in contrast to the situation in 
individual Member States. Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, Germany, France and the Netherlands 
record a higher percent of GDP in public sector 
R&D expenditure than the United States. These 
Member States also perform well in patent 
registrations while in the case of Ireland the 
share of high-tech products in total exports is 
in excess of 40 percent, compared to around 30 
percent in the case of the United States. 
If we accept that intellectual property 
registrations are an indicator of innovation 
activities, do we also correlate this with the 
fact that the United States has no utility model 
system? As the studies discussed in Chapter 4 
show, the patenting surge in the United States 
was driven by several factors: 
• changes in the management of research 
and development activities; 
• smaller and medium sized businesses 
and less established patentees were 
aggressively exploiting the patent system; 
• the amount of United States domestic 
patent applications granted by USPTO 
declined very little (with suggestions of 
regulatory capture of the patent office); 
and
• the low patentability criteria (as discussed 
in Chapter 4). 
The studies also are doubtful whether the actual 
intensity of research effort in the United States 
has risen during the same period. 
2.2		 Utility	Model	Laws	in	
Individual	Member	States
There is currently no consistent policy for 
utility model protection across European Union 
member states. Table 1 offers a bird’s eye view 
of the types of second tier protective regimes 
in 12 European Union Member States. None 
of these systems conform to a single “utility 
model” system. Furthermore, not all member 
states are represented in this listed. Some 
of the missing countries include the United 
Table 1  Current second tier protection 
regimes in E.U. Member 
States
Belgium Brevet de courte durée/
Octrooi van korte duur
Denmark Brugsmodel
Germany Gebrauchsmuster
Greece Πιστοποιητικó νποδειγµατοζ 
χρησιµοτηταζ
Spain Modelo de utilidad
France Certificat d'utilité
Ireland Short-term patent
Italy Brevetto per modelli di 
utilità
Netherlands Zesjarig octrooi
Austria Gebrauchsmuster
Portugal Modelo de utilidade
Finland Nyttighetsmodellagen
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Kingdom, Luxembourg and Sweden. While 
Luxembourg and Sweden do not have any other 
means of protection of innovation other than 
under the patent and design laws, the United 
Kingdom has a second means of protection via 
its unregistered design right system. 
If we reduce the laws into key elements and 
categorise them according to their common 
denominators, for example subject matter 
protected, conditions of protection, examination 
and length of protection, we arrive at a different 
classification as set out in Table 2 – that there 
are three separate systems at work here. The 
latter table reflects, for instance, the fact that 
French and Belgian law, despite terminology, 
are not really utility model systems but quick 
“reservation” systems for patent applications, 
and offer protection akin to the standard patent 
law. The Italian system, however, despite the 
usage of the word “patent”, is more akin to the 
traditional utility model regime.
2.2.1 The patent regime 
Table 3 shows that the so-called utility model 
laws in four Member States mimic the domestic 
patent laws, with identical requirements for 
protection. The criteria of novelty and inventive 
step are identical to that under patent law. Thus, 
the full inventive step criterion and absolute or 
international novelty is required. There is no 
three-dimensional or form limitation within the 
definition.
As stated before, an example of this regime is the 
French certificat d’utilité which runs parallel to 
the patent law system with identical provisions 
and conditions of protection applying to both 
regimes.31 The only main difference is that 
inventions are granted a short term protection 
of six years under a certificat d’utilité, and the 
grant of certificat d'utilité is made without a 
prior search report.32 Another variation on this 
patent prototype theme is the Dutch zesjarig 
octrooi which is governed by the Netherlands 
Patents Act (1995) which provides for a fast-
track, no-examination registration system 
whereby the applicant may obtain a short term 
patent with a duration of six years from the 
application date after formal examination. It is 
open to the applicant to opt for a full patent 
registration or to remain with this short term 
registration. The choice must be indicated 
at the application stage with the applicant 
requesting a novelty search report if he wishes 
a full twenty year patent. Conversely, if the 
applicant makes an immediate request for early 
entry into the Patent Register and confirms 
that no novelty search will be requested, the 
six year patent can be obtained within two to 
three months of application. 
Table 2 Classification according to 
characteristics of the law
Three 
Dimensional 
Regime
German 
Regime Patent Regime
Italy Germany Belgium
Denmark Austria  Ireland
Finland
E.C. Proposed 
Utility Model 
Directive
Netherlands
Greece France
Portugal
Spain
Table 3 Patent type regimes in Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and France
Countries Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland , France
Subject matter Similar to patent law i.e. any invention except those specially stipulated. (identical to Arts. 51-53 European Patent Convention) 
Criteria of Protection Novelty, inventive step, industrial application. Standards of novelty and inventive step are identical to those under patent law.
Duration 6 years: Netherlands, France and Belgium; 10 Years – Ireland
Examination No examination except as to formalities (correct documentation, name and address of applicant and agent) - except Belgium
13
UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development
2.2.2 The three-dimensional 
regime 
Table 4 demonstrates countries which offer the 
traditional type of utility model system i.e. 
the protectable invention must be embodied 
in a three dimensional form. The conditions 
of protection are generally also much less 
stringent than that under patent law. Thus, 
the standard of inventiveness is much less, 
and can be termed a diminished inventive step 
requirement. The standard of novelty differs 
within all these systems. The three-dimensional 
model is not only predominant in the European 
Union member states, but is also the closest 
one gets to a near-consensual model within the 
European Union.
For example, in Spain, utility models are granted 
protection under the Spanish Patents Act.34 A 
utility model is defined as an invention which 
consists of a form, structure or constitution 
which results in a practical and appreciable 
advantage for its use or manufacture and 
in particular utensils, instruments, tools, 
apparatus, devices or parts thereof. Although 
novelty and inventive step are required, utility 
models are truly considered as minor inventions, 
with lower thresholds being required than that 
for patent protection. Novelty is judged at a 
local level with the state of prior art consisting 
of everything which has been published in Spain 
by any means. There must also be some utility 
or advantage being offered. Other European 
Union member states which adopt the three-
dimensional paradigm include 
•	 Denmark -- offering protection to any 
creation which may be industrially applied 
and which contains the solution to a 
technical problem.35
•	 Finland -- according protection to any new 
invention embodied in a shape or design 
of a device or their combination which is 
commercially exploitable. Protection is 
for ten years following a formalities-only 
examination. An option for a substantive 
examination is available on payment of a 
fee.36
•	 Greece -- granting protection to any 
invention which is novel, industrially 
applicable and possesses a solution to a 
technical problem.37
•	 Italy.38 
•	 Portugal -- according protection to 
all models which are new, industrially 
applicable, functional and consisting 
of inventive step. Although there is a 
detailed examination, this has no effect 
in determining questions of validity in the 
event of future civil proceedings.39 
Table 4 Utility model type regimes in Italy, Spain, Denmark, Finland, Greece and 
Portugal
Countries Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Subject matter 
Three-dimensional inventions defined in terms of “form”, “structure” or 
“configuration” which results in a “practical and appreciable advantage” 
for its use or manufacture and in particular utensils, instruments, tools, 
apparatus, devices.
Criteria of 
Protection
The first criterion is novelty. The standard of novelty varies from local novelty 
(Spain and in practice, Italy33) to regional or absolute novelty (Finland, 
Denmark, Greece). However, at times, the statutory requirements seem to 
be at variance with actual standards applied. No consensus as to whether 
there should be a second criterion, and if so, whether it should be “inventive 
step” or “utility” or “advantage” in particular field. All require industrial 
application. 
Duration 7 years: Greece; 10 Years - Denmark, Spain, Finland, Italy; 15 years - Portugal. 
Examination No examination except as to formalities (correct documentation, name and address of applicant and agent).
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2.2.3 The German regime 
The German Utility Model Law protects any 
inventions of technical character that are 
new, based on inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application. A more analytical 
discussion of this form of utility model 
protection is available below in Chapter 2. The 
Austrian law is virtually the same as the German 
law, though it goes further in allowing utility 
model protection to extend to the underlying 
algorithm or process of a computer program; 
the only exclusions under Austrian law seem to 
be microorganisms and similar biotechnological 
inventions, and even chemical processes are 
protectable by way of a utility model.40
2.2.4  Empirical findings
Within the European Union one finds a wide 
disparity in the amount of applications made 
within each country, and this in turn correlates 
to the nature of utility model protection. 
The statistics in Table 5 show utility model 
applications over the period 1987–1991. Most 
countries with utility model protection have 
less than 1000 applications per annum; the only 
countries where the applications exceed the 
1000 mark are Germany, Spain and Italy. One 
reason for the disparity is that some systems 
require a high level of inventive step. A second 
reason for the differences in filing figures is 
that this is a reflection of different economies 
with different manufacturing bases. Finally, 
the French figures do not take into account 
the l’unité de l’art principle under copyright 
and design laws, which is generous in offering 
protection to three-dimensional products.
Table 5 Number of applications for patents & utility models by country selected for the 
period 1987-9141
Country Applications for national patents
Applications for 
European patents
Applications for utility 
models
Germany 88 271 55 672 61 057
Spain 7 306 1 017 17 260
France 31 209 22 350 1 771
Italy 10 369 9 927 10 890
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3  COUNTRIES WITH UTILITY MODEL SYSTEMS
instruments, measurement and control 
engineering, textiles (technical textiles) 
and parts of the chemical industry. 
The Report also identified that, on average 
across industries, German innovators first take 
advantage of their time lead and secrecy, with 
patenting coming only third.  Another tactic 
employed by the industry is to incorporate 
deliberately complex technical product design, 
so as to discourage reverse engineering, and 
to use trade marks.42 The important factor is 
that the German local market and industry 
is considerably knowledgeable as to the 
intellectual property regime.
3.1.2 Historical influences of 
design law 
The German utility model (“Gebrauchsmuster”) 
system has been in place since 1891. It was 
introduced because it was perceived that 
patent law was unsuitable for all types of 
inventions. This derived from the stringent 
German patentability requirement that 
inventions represent a technischer Fortschritt, 
or “technical step forward in the art,” a 
standard that was considered too elevated to 
be met by minor inventions.43 Thus, the utility 
model system was introduced with a lower 
standard of inventiveness, a non-examination 
system, and a short period of protection. 
Conceptually, the German system was not 
a supplemental patent regime; rather the 
utility model protection was introduced as 
a supplement to 1876 legislation protecting 
copyrights and designs. The German utility 
model regime was a classic utility model 
regime i.e. one that is tied inextricably 
to design protection and to preventing 
third parties from duplicating the external 
configurations of certain handtools and 
other everyday implements whose creative 
contribution fell chronically short of the 
inventive height that the mature patent 
paradigm required.44 Thus, the classic utility 
model regime, as exemplified by German 
legislation, was originally conceived as a 
form of design protection. 45
3.1	 Germany
3.1.1 Economic and Innovation 
Climate in Germany
Germany had no coherent or unified industrial 
property policy until the creation of the German 
free trade area in the late nineteenth century. 
The first patent law in the German Reich was 
introduced relatively late in 1877 against a 
background of anti-monopoly and anti-patent 
movements. Part of the reason for this push 
for industrial property protection was the 
change in the economic landscape of Germany. 
German territories, especially Prussian 
ones, were agrarian at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Between 1850 and 1870, 
however, Germany was industrializing rapidly 
and industrial leaders such as the Siemens firm 
organized pro-patent lobbies. 
Today, in terms of the number of patents, 
Germany belongs to the leading international 
group.  German patent output increased in 
recent years after an initial post-reunification 
downturn. n addition to higher innovation 
output, this general growth in patent activity 
may be at least partly due to companies’ 
increasing strategic focus on legal protection for 
intellectual property on globalised markets. 
A Deutsche Bank Report identified the following 
facets within Germany’s economic and industrial 
structure:
— Germany has high labour costs coupled with 
too few other highly skilled personnel;
— There is a lack of innovative drive, and a 
reluctance to invest by SMEs - indeed, the 
R&D expenditures by Sweden and Finland 
now far exceed the German level
— The established companies are now more 
likely to be the major contributors towards 
innovation, rather than SMEs, and they 
generate a far larger proportion of their 
turnover with innovative products 
— Leading German industries are the 
automobile industry, mechanical 
engineering, medical, precision and optical 
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The utility model system was, and is 
still, considered to be an indicator and 
encouragement of local innovative activity in 
the fields of agricultural products and domestic 
appliances. Thus, historically, there has always 
been a “three-dimensional” requirement for 
utility model laws, as such a requirement 
related to the types of innovative activity to 
be encouraged. One could almost say that 
this was an early registered design system for 
functional designs. What the following analysis 
reveals is that the German local industry is very 
knowledgeable about the system and utilises it 
to its fullest extent. 
3.1.3 Current substantive law 
The German Utility Model Law, last amended on 21 
January 2005, protects any inventions of technical 
character that are new, based on inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application.46 In 
addition to the usual excluded subject matter 
under patent law (such as discoveries, scientific  
theories, aesthetic creations, etc)47, the utility 
model law additionally excludes inventions 
relating to processes and biotechnological 
inventions. Furthermore, as opposed to German    
patent law, utility model law requires lesser 
thresholds of protection. The subject matter of 
a utility model is considered new if it does not 
form part of the state of the art. The state of the 
art comprises any knowledge made available to 
the public by means of a written description or 
by use within the territory of Germany before the 
date relevant for the priority of the application 
(i.e. “local novelty”). Non-obviousness under 
utility model law is easier to meet than under 
patent law as the utility model law refers to 
“inventive step”, while the patent act requires 
“inventive activity”, which is a higher level of 
inventiveness.48 The process of obtaining a utility 
model registration is made even simpler by the 
fact that there is no pre-grant examination.
The maximum duration of protection is ten 
years.49
3.1.4  Empirical evidence 
Because the utility model registration is issued 
speedily, inventors tend to file for patents and 
utility models simultaneously. The result is 
that nearly one German patent application in 
every two is accompanied by a utility model 
registration.50 
The German utility models system continues 
to be a popular one. Figures on utility model 
applications filed at the German Patent and 
Trade Mark Office, which include PCT filings, 
show that applications increased steadily up to 
1999. The numbers have fallen from their 1999 
peak, but not by a great deal and the drop is 
insufficient to indicate that use of the system 
is declining. Admittedly, the total of utility 
models in force has fallen from 115,535 in 2000 
to 108,175 in 2003, but given that the number 
of 2002 and 2003 applications are both greater 
than in 2001, this may be a short-term trend. 
The fact that the Germany utility model system 
continues to be popular with industry despite 
Germany’s being ranked by the European 
Commission as sixth most innovative economy 
in the world51 suggests that the advantages 
of utility models are not confined to that of 
facilitating an economy’s advancement from 
developing to developed country status. But it 
may not be quite as simple as that given that 
the poorer East Germany was incorporated 
into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. 
Moreover, if we compare Germany with Japan 
we find the two countries despite their similar 
economic circumstances and innovation climate 
diverged from the mid 1990s, with the German 
filing numbers remaining high while Japanese 
filings markedly declined. 
However, it does appear that despite the 
popularity of utility models in Germany, SMEs 
are still reluctant to invest into R&D. It is 
argued that Germany’s leading position in 
the world market for products is a result of 
its Mittdstand, a network of SMEs, including 
family firms; investment levels according to 
the report has been steadily dropping since 
1998; so worrying is this trend that the German 
Government has started a seed fund to assist 
R&D-based start-ups.52 Arguably, the utility 
model system in Germany may not really be 
serving one of its primary purpose which is to 
spur innovation through SMEs.
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3.2	 Japan	and	South	Korea
3.2.1 Economics and Innovation in 
Japan 
Does an expansion of the scope of patent rights 
induce more innovative effort? An analysis was 
undertaken in 2000 gauging whether the 1987 
Japanese patent reforms had had any impact. 
The reforms had expanded the scope of patent: 
however, the authors found no evidence of a 
statistically or economically significant increase 
in either R&D spending or innovative output 
that could plausibly be attributed to these 
reforms.53
In a more recent 2004 report, Japan ranks ninth 
in terms of competitiveness though much of its 
R&D spending is by large corporations, rather 
than SMEs.54 Nevertheless, another report 
states that Japan languishes in the middle 
of the OECD nations in terms of investment 
in knowledge creation,  R&D  by SMEs and 
venture capital investment as a percentage of 
GDP; the same report gloomily states that as 
Japan’s technology gap with the United States 
widens, its edge over China is shrinking.55 Does 
the shrinking SME contribution explain why 
Japanese utility model registration statistics 
are falling?
3.2.2 The perplexing decrease of 
utility model registration 
figures 
The first utility model law in Japan was enacted 
in 1905 to complement the patent system. 
The main aim of the utility model system 
was to protect less significant inventions and 
to foster technologies of small and medium 
sized enterprises. The utility model system 
was thought to be rapid and easier, and thus 
particularly suitable for SMEs.By the end of 
the 1980’s, however, there were long delays in 
the grant of utility model applications partly 
because the cost difference between the 
patent and utility model systems is negligible, 
and partly because of an increase in the number 
of applications for utility models by both 
small and large companies. In response, the 
Japanese government revised the utility model 
law to allow accelerated registration without 
substantive examination, and to shorten the 
term of protection to six years from the filing 
date on the basis that product lifecycles were 
expected to shorten. Table 6 shows the rate 
of applications and grants of utility models 
over a 23 year period, as compared to the 
(almost) inversely proportional rate of patent 
registrations. 
The emerging pattern is a steady drop in 
applications for registrations from approximately 
191,000 (1980) to 77,000 (1993) to 8,000 (2003). 
While the accelerated registration was popular 
with industry, the legal uncertainty caused by 
the “no examination” rule made the system 
less satisfactory for business – the technology 
transfer of unexamined rights not being popular 
in Japan. It also turned out that many firms were 
unhappy with the reduced term of protection as 
there is little chance of succeeding in an action 
for injunctive relief with a protection period of 
six years. No doubt, these are key reasons for 
the failure of the revised system to reverse the 
fall in applications.56
Another underlying reason for the drop in 
popularity of the utility model system can be 
that the Japanese industry has become more 
innovative and has increasingly been opting 
for the patent route to legal protection of 
its inventions. A more cynical view would be 
that both Japan and the United States have 
experienced increased patenting due to the 
expanded scope of patentable subject matter, 
and due to the relaxed stance of patent 
examiners [see discussion on the United States 
below].
3.2.3 Comparison with the 
converse experience in Korea 
On a regional level, it is interesting to compare 
the Japanese utility model culture with South 
Korea. South Korea has had a utility model law 
since 1961, and the current law is the Utility 
Model Act 1 July 1999. The law offers utility 
model protection to any technical creation 
which utilises the rules of nature – this is similar 
in ethos to the Japanese utility model law. 
The utility model must be novel, capable of 
industrial applicability, and possess an inventive 
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step. Novelty is universal. In parallel with the 
Japanese development, South Korea withdrew 
substantive examination from utility models in 
1999. Anyone can, however, file a request for 
the “technical evaluation” of a utility model 
application or registration, i.e. a detailed 
examination report. An evaluation report, at 
any event, is a prerequisite to any action to 
enforce utility model protection. The right to 
exercise the utility model right can then only 
proceed if the registered utility model owner 
sends a warning letter to the offender including 
a certified copy of the “technical evaluation”. 
The Korean Intellectual Property Office statistics 
note that foreign applications are negligible 
compared to domestic ones. From 1998-2002, 
out of the 176,700 applications submitted to 
the Korean Intellectual Property Office, only 
1,889 came from abroad, which is little more 
than 1 percent of the total. Registration figures 
tell a similar story, with only 2,332 foreign ones 
out of the 184,127 registered during the same 
time period. 
Korean experience is interesting in that its 
domestic sector is active both in utility model 
and patent filing. Of course, compared to 
utility models, foreign patenting activity takes 
place at a much higher rate. However, overall, 
domestic patent filing and registration rates are 
far higher.58 
Table 7 Utility Models statistics for 
South Korea from 1992-2002
Applications Grants
1992 28665 7870
1993 32205 7592
1994 39790 7817
1995 59856 8148
1996 68822 9191
1997 45809 13713
1998 28890 25715
1999 30650 32868
2000 37163 41745
2001 40804 43842
2002 39187 39955
3.2.4 Correlation between utility 
model and innovation 
culture? 
It may be that there has been a shift in 
Japanese filing behaviour in the past 10 years 
due to the shift in the innovation culture in 
Japan. Japanese industries tended to focus 
Table 6 Utility model filing in Japan57
Utility model 
applications
Utility model 
registrations
Patent 
applications
Patent 
registrations
1980 191 785 50 001 191 020 46 106
1981 198 979 50 900 216 307 50 904
1988 171 656 42 300 345 418 55 300
1989 153 277 47 100 357 464 63 301
1990 138 272 43 300 367 590 59 401
1991 114 687 36 500 380 453 36 100
1992 94 601 65 200 384 456 92 100
1993 77 101 53 400 366 486 88 400
1994 17 531 53 885 353 301 82 400
1995 14 886 63 966 369 215 109 100
1996 14 082 95 481 376 615 215 100
1997 12 048 50 108 391 572 147 686
1998 10 917 35 513 401 932 141 448
1999 10 283 21 986 405 655 150 059
2000 9587 12 613 436 865 125 880
2001 8806 9441 439 175 121 742
2002 8603 7793 421 044 120 018
2003 8169 7694 413 092 122 511
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on incremental innovation rather than radical 
innovation during the period from the post-
war years to the 1980’s,59 and this trend has 
reversed. This, in turn, meant that the utility 
model system was not seen to be as vital as 
it had once been.60 The important lessons 
from Japan are that considering that Japan 
was the first Asian country to introduce the 
utility model regime into its domestic law, this 
feature may have enhanced its industrial and 
economic capability in the early 20th century. 
However, innovation may not necessarily 
have been encouraged by non-examination 
– a feature which was only introduced in 1993, 
when utility model registrations were on the 
decline. The drop in registration figures may be 
a consequence of the change in her industrial 
and innovation policy. 
In South Korea, the central government’s 
innovation policy has been focused on SMEs 
and it has recently resulted in a “regional 
innovation support system”. Moreover, South 
Korea’s industrial, technology and regional 
policies have changed so that her economy 
has been re-structured from low-technology, 
labour-intensive, ‘mass production’ types  of 
industry to high-technology, capital- and skill-
intensive, ‘flexible specialisation’ types of 
industry. Conversely, it is also reported that one 
of the weaknesses in South Korea’s innovation 
system is the lack of technological spin-offs and 
the lack of transfer of basic research results 
technology to transfer research results from 
public research establishments to industry and 
particularly to SMEs.
On a more cautious note, however, we should 
note that filing statistics alone do not explain 
macroeconomic trends, and further research is 
needed to explain why the figures are falling in 
Japan but not in Korea despite similar laws and 
reforms. 
3.3	 China
3.3.1 Economic and Innovation 
Climate in China 
China has experienced a paradigm shift and 
has now become a common outsourcing 
manufacturing centre for the United States, 
Japan and Europe.  Tremendous growth has been 
witnessed in recent years after establishing its 
open door policy towards foreign trade and 
investments, and improving its economic and 
legal structures. Advancements in the area 
of information and telecommunications have 
made China a competitive nation in the post-
WTO accession era based on its abundance of 
cheap labour and natural resources. 
Despite the remarkable economic growth and 
development, innovation seems to be rather 
limited as most of the private sector do not 
possess the necessary financial and human 
resources to conduct their own research & 
development activities.61 The strengths that 
are visible within the Chinese economy are 
its industrial restructuring and strengthening 
of economic competitiveness. Weaknesses 
included a critical need for improvement in 
relevant laws and regulations and weakness in 
some industries with respect to international 
competitiveness. One World Bank report 
stated, amongst its many recommendations, 
that China should institute an economic regime 
that offers incentives for the efficient use of 
existing knowledge and creation of knowledge 
and entrepreneurship.62
3.3.2 China’s three tier patent 
system
China’s first patent law was enacted in 1984 
and came into effect in 1985. Since then, the 
law has been amended twice. The first revision, 
undertaken in 1992, extended the patent length 
from 15 to 20 years for invention patents and 
from 5 to 10 years for patents on utility models 
and external designs. The second revision, 
which was completed in September 2000, 
eliminated the provisions under the old law 
that prevented state-owned enterprises from 
trading their patents in technology markets. 
The second revision also introduced new 
provisions designed to make it more rewarding 
for enterprise employees to innovate. Since 
the passage of the 1984 patent law, the central 
government has issued over twenty regulations 
and guidelines to promote innovative activity in 
China. Today’s patent law in China is pretty much 
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in line with the international standard. Up till 
now, China has acceded to all the international 
patent treaties and its laws on intellectual 
property rights meet the requirements of the 
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
Three types of patent protection are available 
in China, namely the invention patents, utility 
models and design patents respectively.  
Invention (standard) Patents – These are 
conventional patents. The protection period is 
20 years from the date of filing or priority date. 
However, excluded from invention patents are 
scientific discoveries, rules and methods for 
diagnosis or the treatment of diseases, animal 
and plant varieties and substances obtained by 
nuclear transformation.  
Design Patents – Original designs relating to the 
shape, pattern, colour or a combination of an 
object.  They have a life-span of 10 years from 
the date of application or priority date. 
Utility Models – Besides the restrictions in the 
invention patents, these include restrictions on 
chemical compounds.  Faster protection under 
the utility model is obtained as no examination 
is required. The time taken for a grant under 
the utility model system typically ranges from 
six months to a year, as against one to four years 
for an invention patent.  A utility model is also 
more attractive as it costs around 40 percent63 
of the invention patent where technologies are 
rapidly changing. Chinese patent law defines 
utility model as a “creation or improvement 
relating to the form, construction, or fitting of 
an object”. 
Novelty means that before the filing date no 
identical invention or utility model has been 
publicly disclosed, used or made known to the 
public anywhere in the world. Despite this, as 
we will see, utility models are being granted to 
local “inventors” for inventions imported from 
overseas. Allegedly, this is giving rise to perverse 
behaviour by some utility model owners – if true, 
a good justification for universal novelty to be 
applied strictly. Inventiveness means that as 
compared with the technology existing before 
the filing date the utility model has prominent 
substantive features and represents progress. 
Practical applicability means that the utility 
model can be made or used and can produce 
effective results. The subject of protection is 
different from that of an invention patent as 
the technical requirements are not as high. 
3.3.3 Empirical analysis of the 
utility model system
Out of a total of 1,569,324 patent applications 
that were made in China between 1994 and 2003, 
about two-fifths (41.3 percent) of them were 
utility models, of which almost all were local 
applications. In contrast, foreign applications 
constituted the majority for standard patents. 
Applications for utility models started to 
increase faster in 2000, reaching 109,115 cases 
in 2003. The higher growth in foreign ownership 
of utility models was due in part to a small base 
of less than 1 percent in absolute numbers for 
both applications and awards respectively for 
each year between 1994 and 2003. Therefore, 
growth in overall utility models was basically 
determined by the domestic market. 
The composition of applications by type and 
ownership was as follows:  
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model
648, 665
644,038
(99.3 
percent)
4,627
(0.7 
percent)
Standard 
patents
476, 041
226,674
(47.6 
percent)
249,367
(52.4 
percent)
Design 
patents
444, 618
407,338
(91.6 
percent)
37, 280
(8.4 
percent)
3.3.4 Policy implications
No economic or statistical analysis of utility 
models in China would be complete without 
mentioning that many utility models are being 
granted to local “inventors” for inventions 
imported from overseas. 
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There are two alternative but possible 
explanations for the statistics. One explanation 
can be that the surge in utility model applications 
can reflect the growth in the innovative sectors 
in China, and a growing awareness of intellectual 
property protection and rights. Apparently such 
second-tier innovation has been put to good use 
by smaller local enterprises, implying a lower 
level of high-value innovation by domestic 
inventors. 
An alternative explanation is that these statistics 
reflect the fact that counterfeiters are now 
employing the utility model and design patent 
systems to claim protection for their modified 
versions of goods and products which are 
protected only under foreign patents. Allegedly, 
this is giving rise to perverse behaviour by some 
utility model owners who are threatening to 
take legal action against the true inventors who 
are often foreign companies seeking to expand 
their commercial activities in China. If true, a 
strong case can be made to argue that universal 
novelty should be applied strictly not only by 
the granting office but also by the courts.64
Finally, as one commentator indicated, 
although the utility model system is viewed as 
being valuable in China, problems exist within 
this system. In his view, the fact that the 
Chinese system offers utility model protection 
without substantive examination means that 
it is difficult to guarantee the quality or level 
of inventiveness involved in a utility model. 
Consequently disputes have occurred. Thus, 
the author suggests that this can be resolved 
by insisting that all applications for utility 
models provide a corresponding search report.65 
Nevertheless, this will increase the costs of the 
system.
Moreover, as the number of patent applications 
and patents granted increase quickly, the 
requests for re-examination and invalidation 
also increase. A Re-examination Board was set up 
in China to deal with appeals filed by applicants 
who were not satisfied with the decision of the 
lower examining board. The Board also deals 
with patent invalidation requests and the rate 
of invalidation requests has been high, making 
up more than 40% of the total. One Chinese 
Patent Office examiner opined that the reason 
for the high invalidation rate is because most 
invalidation proceedings relate to utility models 
i.e. 95% of the invalidation requests were filed 
against patent rights for utility model, and more 
than 60% of the cases ended in the invalidation 
of the utility model right.66 Yet another Chinese 
attorney laments that the utility model system 
is being abused since no examination as to 
substance is made, either at grant stage or even 
at infringement stage (it remains an option for 
the court or administrative authority to ask the 
patentee to furnish a search report). 67
3.4	 Malaysia
3.4.1 Substantive features of the 
utility model system
The following is a summary of the Malaysian 
utility innovation regime:
- No requirement for inventive step
- The application can only contain one 
claim
- The duration of protection is for 20 years 
- Need to show that the invention is in 
commercial or industrial use in Malaysia
- Not subject to compulsory licence
- Lower registration and maintenance costs
Under the Malaysian Patents Act 1983 (as 
amended), two types of protection are 
available - the first is through the grant of a 
patent, and the second is through the issue of 
a certificate for a utility innovation. The latter 
system of protection available under the Act 
aims to protect “minor inventions”, called 
“utility innovations” in the statute, whereby a 
lower level of patentability criteria needs to be 
satisfied. A utility innovation is defined in the 
Act as 
“any innovation which creates a 
new product or process, or any new 
improvement of a known product or 
process, which is capable of industrial 
application and includes an invention”.68
A certificate for a utility innovation can be 
granted if the utility innovation is new and is 
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capable of industrial application. There is no 
requirement for an inventive step, this being 
specifically excluded by the Act.69  
The procedure involved in an application for 
a certificate for a utility innovation, except in 
relation to the number of claims permissible, is 
the same as that for a patent for an invention. 
Unlike a normal patent, where more than one 
claim can be applied for, in the case of a utility 
innovation only one claim is allowed. Two forms 
of substantive examination are available, a full 
substantive examination or a modified substantive 
examination.70 Although it is not possible for 
an applicant to be granted both a patent and 
a certificate for utility innovation for the same 
invention.71 However, it is possible to convert an 
application for a patent into an application for a 
utility innovation and vice versa.72 
A certificate for a utility innovation expires 10 
years from the filing date.73 However, before the 
expiration of this 10-year period, an application 
for extension for two additional five year periods 
of protection can be made. This means that the 
total possible length of protection is 20 years 
from filing date of the application, which is 
the same period available for a normal patent. 
However, before such extensions can be granted 
the owner has to file an affidavit showing that 
the utility innovation is in commercial or 
industrial use in Malaysia. Failing this, he has to 
give satisfactory explanations for its non-use.74 
3.4.2 Empirical analysis of the 
utility model system
According to the Malaysian Intellectual Property 
Office, between 1986 and 2003, there were 
1,222 utility innovation applications. Table 8 
represents the breakdown by year and field of 
technology. 
3.4.3 Policy implications
The main users of the utility innovation system 
come from the region, with 47.3 % of users 
coming from Taiwan, Province of China, followed 
by 38.9 % of the applications emanating from 
Malaysia. The third and fourth most popular 
users of the system originate from the United 
States (4.3 %) and Japan (1.3 %). 
Turning to the proportion of utility innovation 
applications coming from companies and 
individuals and comparing the numbers with 
patents, one finds that from 1999-2003, 34.2 
% of the utility innovation applications came 
from companies and institutions, while 65.8 
% came from individuals. When one turns to    
the patent statistics during the same period, 
the percentages are very different: companies 
and institutions are responsible for 96.2 % 
of applications with only 3.8 % coming from 
individuals. It might appear from this that 
individual inventors find the utility innovation 
system to be more accessible than the patent 
system. Nonetheless, the total of utility 
innovation applications from individuals is 
substantially lower than the number of patent 
application from individuals: 329 for utility 
innovations and 1,102 for patents. 
From the data above, it can be concluded that 
the utility innovation system does have a place 
in the intellectual property system of Malaysia. 
The percentage of Malaysian innovators who 
make use of the system is high compared to 
the use of the patent system. The fact that the 
biggest users of the utility innovation system 
are from Taiwan, Province of China could be 
explained by the fact that a lot of investors for 
the small and medium enterprises come from 
Taiwan, Province of China. 
Table 8 shows that the highest numbers of utility 
innovations encompasses innovations relating to 
human necessities such as footwear, furniture, 
agriculture, jewellery and travelling articles. 
The second highest category is in relation 
to performing operations and transporting, 
classifies innovations relating to mechanical 
operations involving physical or chemical 
processes, machines, apparatus and also 
transportation such as railways, aircraft and 
vehicles. These are areas in which individual 
innovators and SME’s could be involved in the 
creation of incremental improvements without 
the use of high technology. This may reflect 
the fact that the percentage of individual 
innovators compared to companies/institutions 
making use of the utility innovation system is 
very much higher as compared to the use of the 
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patent system.
3.5	 Taiwan,	Province	of	China
3.5.1 Substantive features of the 
utility model system
The first Patent Act, which was introduced into 
Taiwan, Province of China on 1 January 1949, 
included invention patents, utility models and 
design patents.75 The latest version of the Act 
came into effect on July 2004 and introduced 
several substantial amendments to the utility 
model patent. 
The purpose of the utility model patent is to 
protect smaller inventions; under the system 
the inventive step requirement is lower than 
that of a normal invention patent.76 Although 
many aspects of patent law requirements will 
apply to utility model mutatis mutandis, there 
are some fundamental differences between 
patents and utility models, the most important 
of which are as follows:
- patents cover method, substance or a 
device whereas utility models protect 
shape, structure or device;77 
- the duration of patents is 20 years from 
the date of filing, whereas utility model 
protection lasts for 10 years from the date 
of filing;78 
- compulsory licensing is available only for 
patents, and not for utility models; 
- after the June 2004 amendments, utility 
model applications will not be substantively 
examined whereas patent applicants have 
to request a substantive examination 
within three years from the filing date or 
else the patent application will be deemed 
abandoned. 79 
In Taiwan, Province of China “utility model 
patent” is defined as a creation or an 
improvement which has been made in respect 
of form, construction or fitting of an object.80 A 
creation is defined as 
- a shape i.e. a two or three dimensional 
structure/ appearance of an object which 
may be defined by lines and planes and 
which is functional;
- a structure i.e. the internal or integral 
structure of an object. A structure may 
be expressed by arrangements or layouts 
Table 8 Malaysian utility innovations based on field of technology
Section 88-89 '90 '91 '92
'93-
95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 Total %
Human Ne-
cessities - 2 6 2 - 27 11 5 6 2 2 2 3 68 24.9
Performing 
Operations; 
Transporta-
tion
- 4 5 1 - 30 8 3 3 1 2 1 3 61 22.3
Chemistry; 
Metallurgy - - - - - 8 - 2 1 3 - 1 - 15 5.5
Textiles; Pa-
per - - - - - 3 2 - - - - - - 5 1.8
Fixed Con-
structions - 3 5 - - 10 4 1 2 2 4 - - 31 11.4
Mechanical 
Engineering; 
Lighting; 
Heating; 
Weapons; 
Blasting
- - 3 - - 14 6 1 2 1 4 7 1 39 14.3
Physics - - 1 - - 6 1 - 3 1 3 1 2 18 6.6
Electricity - - 2 - - 12 5 - 6 2 7 2 - 36 13.2
Total 0 9 22 3 0 110 37 12 23 12 22 14 9 273 100
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or the relation between components 
contained in an object.  In the structure, 
all components shall have functions other 
than their respective original functions;
- or a device i.e. a device is the purposeful 
combination of a plurality of independent 
objects. The statute further states that a 
device should not be simply a collection of 
objects.81
The Taiwan, Province of Chinaese Patent Act 
requires the device to be novel, inventive and 
industrially applicable. Taiwan, Province of 
China adopts an absolute novelty principle.82 
The level of inventiveness was unclear in that 
it was aligned with creativity.
3.5.2  Alignment with the Japanese 
system – the 2003 utility 
model revisions
The utility model provisions were revised in 
three major ways. First, substantive examination 
was abolished and utility models are now not 
examined for novelty and inventive step prior 
to grant. This was to meet the demand from 
the industry for a faster patent protection for 
products of short lifecycle. However, substantial 
examination will be made in invalidation 
procedures. 
Secondly, the law introduced the concept of 
the “Technical Evaluation Report”. Anyone who 
is uncertain of the enforceability of the utility 
model patent may apply for a technical evaluation 
report from the competent authority such as the 
Taiwan, Province of China Intellectual Property 
Office on a claim by claim basis. The technical 
evaluation report has multiple purposes. It acts 
as an early warning system for patentees wishing 
to enforce the utility model system, aims to avoid 
abuse of the utility model system, and finally, 
it stimulates public inspection. However, the 
technical evaluation report does not have legal 
binding effect or as an administrative order.83 
Finally, an important clarification in relation 
to inventive step was made. The new law 
differentiates the level of inventive step 
required between a patent and a utility model. 
For a standard patent, the requirement of 
inventive step is satisfied if it could not have 
been easily made by those skilled in the art, 
while a utility model is protectable unless it 
would obviously be easy for those skilled in the 
art to invent it. 
3.5.3  Empirical analysis and policy 
implications 
We can see from the tables and statistics below 
that Taiwan, Province of Chinaese nationals 
use utility models rather heavily as compared 
to foreigners. Utility model patents appeal to 
Taiwan, Province of China because 98 percent of 
the country’s businesses are small and medium 
Table 9 Statistics for utility model patent in Taiwan, Province of China (2001-2003)86
Year Application Rejection Approval Certificate issued
2001 25,370 9,668 21,212 16,680
2002 21,750 9,453 16,115 15,200
2003 21,935 11,165 21,439 15,505
Table 10  Statistics on domestic and foreign patent applications in 
Taiwan, Province of China (2001-2003) 87
Year Domestic Foreign
2001 24,220 1,150
2002 20,962 1,058
2003 21,231 704
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sized enterprises (SMEs) with very diverse 
R&D capability.84 Taiwan, Province of China 
businesses’ patent applications tend toward 
the type of patent where they can be rapidly 
granted in order to keep a large number of 
manufacturing process and product patents.85 
Has the high issuance of utility models created 
more disputes? Judging from the table below that 
seems not to be the case, although the numbers 
were for total applications of invention patents, 
utility models and design patents. The numbers 
for utility model applications in 2001-2003 were 
25,370, 21,750 and 21,935 respectively. But the 
table below shows a relatively low invalidation 
rate, probably because prior to June 2004, 
all utility models and invention patents were 
examined substantially by the Intellectual 
Property Office. 
In  2003, the top 5 foreign country recipients of 
granted utility models were: Japan (508), the 
United States (299), Germany (24), South Korea 
(32) and the Netherlands (24). In year 2003, the 
top 5 domestic industry applications by type for 
utility models were:
1. Transporting (2,344)
2. Basic Electronic Elements(2,258)
3. Working of metal (1,962)
4. Domestic Articles (1,933)
5. Pharmaceutical & Entertainment(1,664)
In 2003, the top 5 foreign industry applications 
by type for utility models were:
1. Basic Electronic Elements(188)
2. Transporting(157)
3. Pharmaceutical & Entertainment (148)
4. Domestic Articles(117)
5. Optics(56)
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4 THE UNITED STATES: A COUNTRY WITH NO UTILITY MODEL 
SYSTEM
patent law reforms which opened the path to 
higher patenting levels in the United States.90 
Moreover, developing countries must note that 
part of the innovative environment and climate 
is engendered by the United States Government 
which has, since the 1980s, actively pursued a 
patent policy which has promoted the interests 
of patent owners.91 
4.2	 Current	United	States	
Patent	System
4.2.1 Features of United States 
patent law
The United States patent law is unique in the 
sense that it is the only country retaining a first-
to-invent, as opposed to first-to-file system. 
There are no explicitly defined subject matter 
exceptions such as lists of what is not patentable 
as in European patent law. The criteria for 
patentability are novelty, utility and non-
obviousness. In practice the latter two are not 
very different from industrial applicability and 
inventive step as in numerous other jurisdictions. 
One interesting feature is that, unlike in Europe 
inventors or their successors in title who disclose 
their invention are allowed a grace period of up 
to 12 months during which they can still file a 
patent despite this prior disclosure. 
The United States has reviewed and is still 
reviewing the possibility of introducing second 
tier patent systems to address several problems 
and issues in their current patent system. 
Advantages of a lower-tier patent protection 
being envisaged include the following:
•	 to raise fees and reduce applications for 
top-tier patents.  This would provide 
efficiency with the patent office having to 
examine fewer standard patent cases; 
•	 to eliminate the coverage gap between 
designs and utility models;
•	 to quickly and cheaply protect inventions 
of incremental nature and having short 
commercial life in a fast moving technology 
market as is the United States; 
4.1	 The	United	States	National	
Innovation	System	and	
Patent	Law
The United States is, perhaps, the world’s 
biggest intellectual property producer. 
Nevertheless, the United States has never had 
second tier patent protection, though there 
are some calls for such a system to exist.88 How 
far, then, does the United States intellectual 
property law protect minor innovations? There 
is limited scope for protecting innovation under 
the United States design patent and trade dress 
laws; however, highly functional innovations 
usually claim protection under patent law. One 
can, of course, speculate on the reasons why 
the United States has felt no need for a second 
tier regime. Perhaps as a net exporter of 
intellectual property goods, the United States 
has no need to worry about reducing the level 
of imports - the fact that it is a major exporter 
of intellectual property goods, including 
patented goods, shows that the current 
system of patent law and design patent law 
works for this particular economic and social 
environment. Another possibility is that most of 
the innovations and inventions do not emanate 
from SMEs but rather from large transnational 
corporations, and the level of competition 
amongst these firms is high enough to maintain 
the incentive and momentum to create - no 
further legislative activity is required to furnish 
additional inducement. Finally, one can also 
state that the main concern of the United States 
legislators is not so much its domestic market, 
but protecting its intellectual property goods 
outside its jurisdiction, and its national policy 
has focused on maintaining a high intellectual 
property regime outside its borders.
But however tempting these conclusions are, 
they do not hold up against recent studies 
which show, first, that small to medium sized 
corporations dominate the patenting scene, 
and second, that the rate of grant of patents is 
high compared to the low rate of invalidation.89 
Part of the reason stems from the 1982 
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•	 to discourage defensive patenting by firms 
as standard patents become much more 
expensive. 
4.2.2 The policy implications 
One view is that the United States, in not 
introducing a second tier protection regime, 
together with its equally strict design patent 
regime, has an industrial policy that emphasises 
free competition within the product and 
innovation markets. Developing countries 
wishing to emulate the innovative spirit and 
culture of this major industrial country may 
conclude that the absence of a second tier 
regime is a contributing factor. However, 
whilst some may be led to think that this is the 
best course for a pro-competitive innovative 
climate, it can be argued that the United 
States intellectual property system is difficult 
to transplant to other jurisdictions.92 
First, it is difficult to appreciate the scope of its 
patent law without recognising how this interacts 
with other laws such as trade dress (as discussed 
below) and competition laws. Thus, one should 
note that in some cases of unfair copying of 
innovation in the United States, firms do resort 
to unfair competition laws.93 Secondly, the legal 
and political infrastructure of the United States 
(as ensured by the constitution) ensures that 
there is a balance between intellectual property 
rights owners and the public interest, albeit 
that this balance has shifted in recent years 
towards a pro-intellectual property position.94 
Nevertheless, the legal infrastructure within 
the United States ensure that a check is made 
at some point – either by Congress or by the 
courts. Developing countries may not be able to 
implement such checks and balances.
An alternative view is that the United States has 
no need for a second tier system as the current 
patent system is relaxed enough to protect 
minor innovations, especially by small and 
medium sized firms. First, the USPTO and the 
courts have been granting patents to inventions 
which show a low level of inventive step.95 
Secondly, analyses undertaken by Lerner et al 
since 1997 to 2003 suggests that the increase 
in patenting activity in the United States may 
be due to increased innovative activities of 
smaller firms. The studies show that whilst 
there was no evidence to suggest that larger 
firms were particularly innovative, there was 
nevertheless disproportionate representation 
of smaller firms, especially those with stronger 
academic ties.96 Finally, the Lemley and Thomas 
studies show that the USPTO has extended 
patent protection to new technologies such as 
biotechnology, software and Internet business 
without being unduly hampered by lack of 
documentation relating to the state of art or 
the lack of training of its patent examinees in 
these new technologies.97
Indeed, one can perhaps go further and argue 
that the lack of a second-tier system puts 
pressure on the patent system to accommodate 
minor inventions. Indeed, the 2003 FTC Report 
has expressed concern in the United States 
as to the maintenance of the proper balance 
between patent protection and competition, 
as the current swing is too much in favour of 
patents. Is it arguable that the introduction of 
a second-tier system in the United States may 
contribute to keeping the public domain freer 
than under the more expansive patent system? 
(i.e. longer terms of protection). 
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5 ALTERNATIVES TO UTILITY MODELS : DESIGN LAW AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION
many inventions are vulnerable to unfair copying, 
and that in many cases, the subpatentable ones 
are the most vulnerable of all. 
5.1	 United	States	Federal	
Design	Patent	and	Trade	
Dress	Laws
5.1.1 Design patent law
The United States design patent law is extremely 
demanding in comparison with other countries. 
Protection is available under patent law for 
“any new, original and ornamental design for 
an article of manufacture.”100 Furthermore, in 
order for a design to qualify for design patent 
protection, it must present an aesthetically 
pleasing appearance that is not dictated 
by function, and it must satisfy the general 
criteria of patentability, i.e. full novelty and 
non-obviousness.101 In brief, the law does not 
give protection to “new designs” or “original 
designs”, but rather to designs which fulfil 
both criteria and requires candidates to fulfil 
a higher threshold of protection by requiring 
non-obviousness as well, a term more identified 
with the patent criterion of “inventive step”. 
The problems which arise stem from the 
impossibly high criteria imposed on designs. 
In practice, the rate of invalidation of design 
patents is high as the federal appellate courts 
are in the habit of routinely invalidating issued 
design patents that reach them in infringement 
actions.102 Moreover, the thresholds of protection 
imposed on design patents are far higher than 
those applied to patents. The specific criteria 
of protection, and the related problems, are:
(i) Novelty: a high standard of novelty is 
applied although the Patent Act does 
provide a one year novelty grace period for 
both utility and design patents, allowing 
designers the opportunity to market test 
their designs.103
(ii) Ornamentality: this test can be set at high 
levels whereby the court must be satisfied 
that the design appeals to the eye as a 
thing of beauty.104 
When it comes to extending intellectual 
property to new “things”, in this case 
subpatentable inventions, the options available 
to policymakers are to fit such products into 
existing intellectual property categories or to 
create new intellectual property rights. In the 
words of William Cornish98, 
Intellectual property may be extended to 
new subject matter either by accretion or by 
emulation. Accretion involves re-defining an 
existing right so as to encompass the novel 
material; emulation requires the creation of a 
new and distinct right by analogy drawn more or 
less eclectically from the types already known. 
Utility models are an example of emulation. But 
emulation is inherently risky in the sense that 
they are essentially experimental. Accretion may 
be a safer option. One possibility, that we explore 
in this chapter, may be to protect subpatentable 
inventions under design law. Our research into 
the British, German and Australian utility model 
systems from a historical perspective indicates 
that the inception and subsequent development 
of second-tier patent protection was a response 
to perceived deficiencies in both patents and 
designs law. Existing design legislation did not, 
in the German and Australian99 experiences, 
protect functional innovations; whilst in the 
British case, design legislation was adapted so 
as to plug the gap that was found to exist in the 
protection of minor and incremental innovations 
and inventions. Moreover, a consideration of the 
actual subject matter of protection under the 
various European utility model laws reveals that 
the term “utility model” often incorporates many 
of the elements that would ordinarily constitute 
a functional or technical design. 
Another possibility is to take advantage of 
unfair competition. This may be justified on the 
basis that, as indicated earlier, although utility 
model laws confer exclusive property rights, the 
underlying rationale for having them is usually 
to accede to industries’ call for an anti-copying 
right or a misappropriation tort. Indeed, the main 
practical justification derives from the fact that 
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(iii) Non-obviousness or “inventiveness”:105 
a major issue in respect of the last 
criterion is determining from whose 
perspective obviousness is judged. The 
Court of Customs and Patents Appeals In re 
Nalbandian106 stated that, in design cases, 
the fictitious person identified in § 103 as 
“one of ordinary skill in the art” will be 
the designer of ordinary capability who 
designs articles of the type presented in 
the application.
The difficulties posed by the statute are 
exacerbated by the judicially forged and 
developed “functionality” doctrine which is an 
attempt to prevent the circumvention of patent 
law by technically dictated designs. While most 
courts agree that design patent law should 
eschew fully functional designs, what remains 
unclear is the exclusionary device. One method 
is to cross-refer the test of functionality with 
the market environment, by either looking at 
the commercial success of the design or the 
existence of competing designs within the 
same product market.107 A second method is to 
view functionality as being the flip side of non-
obviousness.108 A third, and more usual, method 
is to use the criterion of ornamentality to exclude 
functional designs.109 A final means by which the 
functionality doctrine is applied can be seen in 
the decision of Avia Group International v L.A. 
Gear California110, where the Federal Circuit 
held that the design patents for shoes patterns 
were valid and not functional:
…if  the functional aspect or purpose could be 
accomplished in many other ways that is [sic] 
involved in this very design, that fact is enough 
to destroy the claim that this design is primarily 
functional.
5.1.2 Trade dress laws
Designs are also protected under the U.S. 
federal copyright and trade dress protection (a 
branch of trademark protection). Theoretically, 
functional designs are excluded from protection. 
Practically, the USPTO exercises a more strict 
control over functional designs under design 
legislation than under trademarks legislation, or 
the courts over federal trade dress protection. 
The common law of unfair trade or passing off 
was formally codified in the Lanham Act 1946 
and serves as the basis for trademark actions. In 
light of the difficulty faced in gaining protection 
under the patent, copyright and state unfair 
competition laws for minor innovations and 
designs, attempts were made using the Lanham 
Act to obtain protection for product shape and 
configurations as unregistered trade dress. 
The basis of protection was obtained under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The provision 
stipulates: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services, or any container for goods, 
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which.…is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive 
as to the affiliation, connection, or association 
of such person with another person, or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person.…shall be liable in a civil action 
by any person who believes that he or she is 
likely to be damaged by such act.111
The notion of trade dress of a product consists 
of the “overall image used to present it to 
purchasers; it could thus include, to give a partial 
list, the product’s size, shape, colour, graphics, 
packaging, and label.”112 By including physical 
features of the product itself, traditional trade 
dress protection, which normally protected only 
the appearance of packages and advertising 
displays, has been expanded to include physical 
features of the product itself. In the past, 
two fundamental rules preserved the balance 
between trade dress protection and patent 
protection of designs. The first rule was that 
designs could only gain trade dress protection 
if the product shape had acquired secondary 
meaning.113 The second principle was that any 
successful trade dress suit had to demonstrate 
that the alleged copier’s product was similar 
enough to cause confusion in the public as to 
the source of the product.114 
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The first development which was to expand 
trade dress protection was the jettisoning of 
the criterion of secondary meaning.115 In 1992, 
the Supreme Court confirmed this approach in 
Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc.116 which held 
that an inherently distinctive restaurant motif 
was protected as trade dress despite a lack of 
secondary meaning. The second development 
was the expanded definition of trade dress from 
the product’s packaging to the actual product. 
Finally, the courts commenced applying 
an extremely liberal definition of public or 
consumer confusion, which included dilution. 
The Supreme Court has recently confirmed that 
this requirement is no longer necessary if the 
trade dress is inherently distinctive.117 
Thus, under trade dress protection, a product 
could gain unlimited protection.118 There 
appears to be little demarcation between 
trade dress and utility or design patent laws. 
However, the extent of protection under the 
former is subject to the functionality doctrine 
which states that functional aspects of the 
product will not be accorded either trade mark 
or trade dress protection - it is feared that 
this protection would impede the entrance of 
competitors into the market place.119 However, a 
small amount of functionality will not invalidate 
protection if the overall effect of the product is 
non-functional.120 
In relation to the protection of product shape 
or trade dress, functionality is said to be 
present when such features are essential to the 
use or purpose of the article.121 In  re Morton-
Norwich Products Inc.122, the court re-assessed 
the question of functionality and consequently 
reasoned that trademark law only excludes 
product designs which are de jure functional. 
In respect of the Morton-Norwich’s shape of a 
spray container, the court held that de jure 
functionality was to be resolved by determining 
whether the bottle was “the best or one of a 
few superior designs available.” There was 
no evidence that the shape of the bottle was 
required to be as it was. The same function 
could be performed by a variety of other 
shapes.123 On the other hand, in re Deister 
Concentrator Co.124 the court refused trade 
mark registration to a rhomboidal shaped table 
for cleaning coal as the shape was functional. 
The court noted that any feature dictated by 
functional considerations may not be protected 
as a trade mark; however, the court emphasised 
again that the mere possession of a function is 
not sufficient reason to deny protection.
5.2	 Design	Law	in	Europe
5.2.1 Substantive features of the 
EU design system 
The European Union design regime is governed 
by the Community Design Regulation 2001 and 
the Design Directive 1998.125 The prospective 
rights owner has a choice as to the type of CDR 
required as the Regulation offers a two-tier 
system: 
(a) the Registered Community Design Right 
which confers registration-based exclusive 
rights; and
(b) the Unregistered Community Design Right 
which confers an automatic anti-copying 
right based on first marketing. 
It may be possible to claim protection under 
the European design regime for minor 
innovations due to the broad ambit of the law. 
For example, the definition of “design” is wide 
enough to encapsulate all types of products 
including parts intended to be assembled into 
a complex product. The only problem for minor 
innovations is that they may fall foul of the 
exclusion clauses. Design protection will not be 
granted to the following subject matter:126
•	 features of appearance of a product 
which are solely dictated by its technical 
function; 
•	 “interconnection” features, i.e. features 
of appearance of a product which must 
necessarily be reproduced in their exact 
form and dimensions in order to permit 
the designed product to be mechanically 
connected to or placed in, around or 
against another product so that either 
product may perform its function; 127
•	 designs which are contrary to public policy 
or to accepted principles of morality.
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The “technical function” exclusion is apparently 
to be construed narrowly - a design feature 
will only be excluded if the feature concerned 
is essential in order to achieve a particular 
technical result. In other words, if form follows 
function. Thus, functional innovation can be 
eligible for protection as long as one shows that 
the same technical function could be achieved 
by another different form.128 
Design law has no high threshold of protection – 
the design must be novel and must have individual 
character.129 Novelty is assessed at a universal 
level, with the prior state of art encompassing 
any identical design (or a substantially similar 
design which differs only in immaterial details), 
made available to the public. A design will have 
individual character if the overall impression 
it produces on the informed user differs from 
the overall impression produced on such a user 
by any design which has been made available 
to the public. Notably, a further limitation is 
placed on the width of the prior art taken into 
consideration for the purposes of novelty and 
individual character: in some cases, published 
designs will not be taken into account where 
the publication could not reasonably have 
become known in the normal course of business 
to specialized European business circles.130
The design proprietor can opt for a registered 
or an unregistered Community design right. In 
respect of the latter, the proprietor will have an 
exclusive right to use it.131 Indeed, the registered 
design right offers exclusive monopoly for a 
longer term of period than the proposed utility 
model right, or indeed the existing patent right. 
The duration of protection is for an initial period 
of five years, which is renewable for four further 
periods of five years, up to a maximum of twenty 
five years. Examination is restricted to formalities 
and excluded subject matter – there is no search 
as to novelty or individual character. 
If, on the other hand, the proprietor opts for the 
unregistered Community design right, a lesser 
right against copying is conferred. Moreover, 
the anti-copying right is limited in that it will 
not be effective where use is deemed to result 
from “copying the protected design if it results 
from an independent work of creation by a 
designer who may be reasonably thought not to 
be familiar with the design made available to 
the public by the holder.”132 The unregistered 
Community design right, admittedly, is a poor 
relation to both the Community registered design 
right or to the British unregistered design right 
(which is not affected by all these European 
developments, and remains distinct and sui 
generis). The Community unregistered design 
right arises automatically and lasts for a period 
of three years only, from the date from the date 
on which the design was first made available to 
the public within the Community.133 
5.2.2 Empirical findings for the EU 
design law
In the first half of 2004, the European Office 
for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(OHIM), which is the office responsible for the 
Community trade mark and Community design 
registrations, showed that 30,162 designs were 
filed. The figure below shows a cross comparison 
between the European registration office, the 
German office and the Japanese office. 
Table 11 Comparative table of design filing in 1999-2004
Year Offices design registratiOns
1/1/2004-30/6/2004
European Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market
30,162
1/1/2004-30/6/2004 German Patent and Trademarks Office 21,078
1/1/2004-30/6/2004 Japan Patent Office 16,646
2003 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 19,935
2003 German Patent and Trademarks Office 54,670
2003 Japan Patent Office 31,342
From 1999 – 2002 No European Design Law -
From 1999 – 2002 German Patent and Trademarks Office 279,584
From 1999 - 2002 Japan Patent Office 145,829
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It appears from OHIM’s statistics that very little 
is rejected compared to the total amount of 
filed registrations. The table below shows that 
the total amount of rejected applications is less 
than 1 percent of received applications.
Table 12 Rate of refusal and grant 
under the Community design 
law
2003 2004 Total
Designs 
received 40,623 53,650 94,273
Refused 4 274 278
Registered 
and 
published
19,934 57,765 77,699
5.2.3 Policy Implications 
What sort of protection is offered to three-
dimensional products within the European 
Union under other laws? How generous are 
these systems in protecting minor innovations? 
Can the presence of such systems explain the 
low registration figures (i.e. quick, cheap, 
non-registration protection regimes such 
as the unregistered design right or unfair 
competition)?
The major fault in obtaining protection for 
minor innovations under the EU design law is 
that the scope of protection may be limited 
to the “overall impression” of the design. 
In other words, the law will not protect an 
underlying function or principle but rather the 
appearance of the product. This is different to 
the United Kingdom unregistered design right 
which extends protection to the shape and 
configuration of the design, as opposed to the 
“impression” that the design produces on the 
informed user.134 Although the law specifically 
excludes protection from “methods or principles 
of construction”, there may be instances where 
the UK unregistered design right does lead to 
underlying technical functions & principles 
being protected, especially if such features are 
inherent in the (directly) protected shape & 
configuration.
Developing countries may have two alternatives: 
to either introduce a UK type unregistered 
design right which extends to protecting 
functional shapes, or a utility model type of law 
which is specifically designed for the protection 
of technical functions.
5.3	 Unfair	Competition
According to Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention, the following acts are prohibited on 
the grounds of constituting unfair competition:
•	 all acts of such a nature as to create 
confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial 
or commercial activities, of a competitor;
•	 false allegations in the course of trade 
of such a nature as to discredit the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial 
or commercial activities, of a competitor;
•	 indications or allegations the use of which in 
the course of trade is liable to mislead the 
public as to the nature, the manufacturing 
process, the characteristics, the suitability 
for their purpose, or the quantity, of the 
goods.
Many countries have a general unfair competition 
law which is based on fault or wrongdoing.135 
Any infringement of an intellectual property 
right invariably involves fault or wrongdoing 
on the part of the imitator. Thus, although 
serving to punish the conduct of the imitator, 
unfair competition laws can indirectly protect 
proprietary rights, and in this manner can be 
employed to supplement the protection of a 
design. 
5.3.1 Rationales for unfair 
competition law
One view as to the function of unfair 
competition law is that it acts as a corollary 
to competition law. While competition law 
protects the institution of competition as 
the chosen order of the marketplace, unfair 
competition theory regulates the behaviour of 
the various competitors with regard to their 
behaviour to the marketplace.136 This is in 
tandem with the view that unfair competition 
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law relates to the conduct of an imitator, 
rather than what is imitated. The second view 
holds that unfair competition should not be 
based on ethics as determining the standards of 
behaviour but rather should determine whether 
or not the result of the competitor’s behaviour 
hinders or stifles the competitive process of 
differentiation and imitation.137 This view 
upholds the sanctity of consumer welfare as the 
prime consideration, as opposed to upholding 
moral standards within the marketplace. For 
instance, imitation products on the market 
may reflect the dishonest business practices 
of the imitator, but there should be some 
consideration as to whether the products are 
also economically beneficial to the consumer 
if they bring the market price down and force 
standardisation of the product.
5.3.2 Minor innovations and unfair 
competition
Inventions with lower inventive step do not 
fulfil the patent criteria and it was, thus, 
traditionally thought that such inventions should 
be left in the public domain. The problem of 
extending unfair competition protection to 
such innovations is that this move undermines 
the perceived need to have specific exclusions 
of technically necessary or functional features 
from copyright, design, and trade mark laws. 
The whole rationale for these latter exclusions 
is that technical inventions which did not meet 
the patent criteria should not gain protection 
by the back door. 
Secondly, unfair competition laws, in some 
jurisdictions, will protect against such copying 
or imitation. Although some member states’ 
laws have developed some jurisprudence that 
unfair competition laws cannot usurp other 
intellectual property statutory rights, especially 
in relation to patentable features, the law is 
not totally clear and there have been many 
instances where the tort of slavish copying 
has stepped in to protect such technical or 
functional features. 
Thirdly, is it now the standard rule in intellectual 
property law that wherever there is some 
investment or some creativity which is open 
to imitation and copying, that the intellectual 
property good should be protected? Have we all 
succumbed to Mr. Justice Peterson’s adage that 
“what is worth copying is worth protecting”? 
The danger of applying unfair competition 
laws liberally to protect intellectual property 
subject matter is that an untenable monopoly 
can arise in relation to a work which has either 
been denied protection under other intellectual 
property rights or ceased to be protected 
under any intellectual property rights.138 Unfair 
competition laws can undermine the delicate 
balance between intellectual property laws 
and competition laws, thereby resulting in anti-
competitive protection of minor innovations. 
5.3.3 Unfair competition in Europe
European Union Member States’ courts are 
reluctant to extend protection for subject 
matter which has already enjoyed protection 
under other intellectual property rights. The 
general principle is that the imitation of products 
is allowed if they are not protected by other 
intellectual property laws.139 This is especially 
true in the absence of further and special 
circumstances, such as behaviour contrary 
to ethical business practices, misleading or 
confusing behaviour, unfair exploitation of the 
plaintiffs’ goodwill or obstructing the plaintiff 
from exploiting the economic benefits of his 
products.140 An apt summary of the position was 
offered by the Dutch Supreme Court: 
Everybody should be, generally speaking, free 
to develop his industrial products in the best 
way possible and to give them the highest utility 
- except when exclusive rights are awarded to 
others on the basis of the patent or copyright 
statutes which prevent this - it is permitted for 
that purpose, in his own interest and possibly 
to the detriment of his competitor, to make 
use of the inventive ideas and results which are 
embodied in his product, even if (it is) only on 
the basis of that use confusion could be the result 
between his own product and the competitor’s…
thus the imitation of the product of a competitor 
is not allowed only if, without doing harm to the 
function and use, another avenue could have 
been followed on certain points, and by not 
being followed confusion is created.141
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(i) Germany 
German unfair competition law142 prohibits 
all acts of competition that are unfair and 
capable of materially distorting competition 
by harming competitors, consumers or other 
market participants. There is no definite 
duration of protection as each case will depend 
on the facts; in general, however, the court will 
offer unfair competition protection sometimes 
to unprotected innovation for a reasonable 
period so as to enable the creator to exploit his 
competitive advantage. Protection consists in 
the right of the plaintiff to ask for a cessation 
of the infringing activity and the removal of 
infringing products. 
German unfair competition law assumes that 
in absence of intellectual property protection, 
there should be nothing to impede the copying 
of an innovation.143 Thus, the mere copying 
of a competitor’s product will not necessarily 
be tantamount to a breach of the unfair 
competition law, especially where the product 
has been initially protected under an intellectual 
property right which has since expired. The 
courts will protect against the copying of 
products under the unfair competition laws only 
where additional elements or circumstances are 
present, such as:  
• misleading customers and disloyalty
• causing confusion and / or unfair 
exploitation of the plaintiffs’ goodwill 
• obstructing the plaintiff from exploiting 
the economic benefits of his products 
• value of the innovation in terms of its 
functionality  or cost effectiveness 
• short life span of the innovation
• direct misappropriation and/or regular and 
systematic copying 
There are exceptions. First, courts will protect 
innovation if in their view the plaintiffs require 
protection against competition in order to reap 
their profits, especially taking into account 
the expenditure of resources in innovating 
the new product. Secondly, highly original and 
innovative products are not generally open to 
copying, especially if they function as a source 
indicator and where the conduct of the imitator 
can be considered as unfair.144 
Although copying another person’s product is 
generally allowed in the name of free trade and 
competition, especially where confusion is not an 
issue, sometimes the jurisprudence does prohibit 
direct misappropriation or slavish copying of 
another’s product. The unfairness of this activity 
is found in the fact that in addition to the 
imitation, the defendant is also making direct 
use of the product of the plaintiff-manufacturer 
without any expenditure on his part, thus taking 
the fruits of the plaintiff's money, skill and 
labour, without investing any of his own. For 
direct misappropriation to be found unlawful, 
there are three main requirements. First, the 
work sought to be protected must have some 
characteristics worthy of protection i.e. there 
must be evidence of the plaintiff’s investment in 
the work or the product has a certain distinctive 
character; secondly, the copying must have 
caused some actual damage to the creator of the 
work; finally, the imitator could have reasonably 
have utilised other features which differed from 
the original product.145
(ii) France
In France, unfair competition (concurrence 
déloyale) law provides remedies for any civil or 
legal wrong based on the finding of “fault”.146 
The most frequently sought circumstances under 
which an action on unfair competition is brought, 
concerning an intellectual property subject 
matter, are confusion, rival disparagement or 
unlawful attacks. However, it is debatable as 
to whether imitation, per se, is insufficient to 
constitute an action, especially where the work 
or product is not protected by any intellectual 
property right. As a fundamental principle, in 
the absence of any intellectual property rights, 
the product can be freely appropriated by all. 
However, such liberty is not without its limits, 
especially where there is excessive usage to 
the detriment of commerce. Thus, the act of 
imitation can develop into a tortious act if the 
reproduction was for an unfair purpose or if the 
resulting confusion between products cannot 
be justified on other grounds. 
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The general principles governing imitation 
of products can be reduced to the following 
principles: 
• copying an item in the public domain 
cannot amount to fault 
• unfair competition law cannot be invoked 
as it is not a civil wrong to reproduce an 
unprotected object even if damage is 
caused – a further element is required 
• the reproduction of products belonging to 
the public domain is wrong if this is done 
with a view to creating a confusion in the 
public concerning the origin of products 
sold
• the taking of fruits of another’s industry 
and investment is unjust enrichment 
and parasitic competition (concurrence 
parasitaire)147 
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6 RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS
6.1		 Justifying	IPRs
Patents are tools for economic advancement 
that should contribute to the enrichment 
of society through (i) the widest possible 
availability of new and useful goods, services 
and technical information that derive from 
inventive activity, and (ii) the highest 
possible level of economic activity based 
on the production, circulation and further 
development of such goods, services and 
information. In pursuit of these aims, inventors 
are able to protect their inventions through 
a system of property rights – the patent 
system. One of the reasons that patents are 
so controversial is that the IP incentive, as far 
as it actually works, functions by restricting 
use by others of the protected invention for 
a certain period. Yet follow-on innovation by 
others is more likely to happen if use is not 
restricted. Thus a balance between private 
control over the use of technical information 
and its diffusion needs to be struck. Where 
the line should be drawn is very difficult to 
determine but its ideal location will vary 
widely from one country to another, and, 
one may argue from one business sector to 
another. In countries where little inventive 
activity takes place, free access to technical 
information may well do more to foster 
technological capacity building than providing 
strong private rights over such information. 
We face two conflicting schools of thought. 
An economic classicist would argue that the 
main role of patent law is to prevent rewards 
from being dissipated by competing imitations 
and to preserve the incentive for continual 
innovation leading to economic growth. If we 
unconditionally accept this perspective, the 
rationale for increasing the scope of patent 
protection to encompass minor or incremental 
inventions is clear. 
Nevertheless, we are also cautioned against 
broadening protection to such an extent 
that the excessive allocation of rights to an 
innovator will lead to a severe drop in the 
number of competitive substitutes or may 
completely prevent any other competitive 
substitute from appearing in that market.148 
From this perspective, we are reminded that, 
considering the heavy price that the society 
will have to pay in stifling competition in 
respect of innovations, patent law has been 
designed to only confer exclusive proprietary 
rights in certain types of inventions viz. those 
inventions which exhibit some technical 
character, and which manifest the necessary 
level of inventiveness and novelty. A more 
forceful objection to minor inventions is made 
by Kitch who states that “low-cost inventions” 
should not be patentable since the inventor is 
always rewarded by a head start, and these 
types of inventions would exist anyway in the 
absence of a patent system.149
How then do we justify lowering the thresholds 
of protection in order to extend protection 
to minor or incremental innovations? The 
argument that market failure will result if 
excessive protection is granted to inventions 
cannot be easily deflected by reasons of 
administrative or cost problems, or by the 
fact that some inventions are susceptible 
to unfair copying. Nonetheless, introducing 
a utility system could potentially stimulate 
further innovation. If so, in it would do so on 
the following bases:
(i) Less knowledge-based150 industries would 
be able to seek protection for innovations 
which do not meet the necessary 
requirements or need the level of 
protection required for a standard patent. 
(ii) High-knowledge industries like the 
semiconductors, ICT-related products 
and computer peripherals would be able 
to protect lower-end innovations with a 
more economical alternative to patents.
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6.2	 Policy	Options	
European industries have complained that 
they are now vulnerable to unfair copying by 
competitors and that the unavailability of patent 
protection robs them of the vital lead-time 
required to recoup research and developmental 
costs. Nevertheless, industry has also opposed a 
European Community-wide utility model regime 
out of fear of restricting competition. If we look 
at the patterns of inventive activity in Europe, 
it is not at all clear that utility models are vital 
for innovative growth – witness Sweden’s top 
position in the European innovation scoreboard 
and its lack of second tier patent system. 
Indeed, a more interesting development is 
the European attempt to broaden the scope of 
patent law to encompass more subject matter 
and offer wider scopes of protection – this may, 
following the United States, be the approach 
to adopt. 
It might be that rather than follow the 
experiences of countries already having utility 
model systems, developing countries without 
utility models would be better off with a policy 
of “intellectual property leapfrogging”. By this, 
we mean that they should consider eschewing 
the evolutionary approach adopted by these 
countries (and many of today’s rich countries 
in the past) of opting for utility models as a 
means to accelerate their advance to developed 
country status, and instead learn from and 
emulate present day Japanese and United 
States innovation promotion regulation where 
the role of utility models is either diminishing 
or was never existent. 
It is advisable to determine the long-term 
sustainability of the utility model system with 
a cost-benefit analysis, weighing carefully the 
pros and cons and their possible economic 
impact to which this study acts as a precursor. 
In implementing a utility model system, 
careful planning and effective dissemination 
of information, as well as developing the 
awareness of the target market would be of 
critical importance to the success of the new 
system. 
There are three options which a developing 
country can consider.
Status quo approach - A developing country 
can accept the existing intellectual 
property regime, without introducing any 
new right. 
This may be due to the fact that an analysis 
of the country’s economic and industrial 
environment fails to demonstrate that the 
country stands significantly to benefit in terms 
The following questions then arise:
1. Does the country in question require rapid, cheap protection for local industrial growth 
and promotion? 
2. Is there an economic argument as to why such inventions should be protected?
3. Are the current patent and design regimes suited to industry’s needs in terms of criteria 
of protection, costs and ease of use?
4. Is there a need to reconsider the economic and legal policy of granting patent protection 
to innovative activities; and if there is, whether these new policies are best served 
within a one tier or two tier patent regime in the developing country (or even a three 
tier system if one includes the design right regime)?
5. Is there massive copying of minor innovations? 
6. Is there a need to maintain a large public domain to assist follow-on innovation?
7. Would the country be placed at a disadvantage if other countries use a utility model 
system in a major way?
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of innovation or economically from introducing 
a utility model system. Note that there is always 
some unhappiness from the local stakeholders’ 
perspectives as to the cost, length of time before 
rights are granted, and about the complexity 
of the current intellectual property system. If 
incremental inventions are to be protected, 
there must be a valid reason as to why a utility 
model system is to be introduced, and why this 
proposed law will institute a more favourable 
regime as compared with the current patent or 
design laws. 
Accretion approach - A developing country 
can adjust the existing intellectual 
property regime without introducing a 
utility model right. This can be done by 
extending existing intellectual property 
rights to new subject matter (such as sub 
patentable or functional innovation) by 
re-defining an existing right to encompass 
the new material.
The accretion method involves a minor 
tinkering of the country’s patent or design or 
unfair competition system.151 In relation to the 
patent system, it is worthwhile to note the 
reasons suggested for the high patenting figures 
in the United States including a decreased 
invalidation rate and the commensurate 
pressure on the United States Patent Office to 
grant patents. 
Another point worth considering is the ability 
of design law to encompass very wide subject 
matter – indeed, the TRIPS Agreement is 
incredibly flexible in relation to the criteria 
and scope of protection in relation to designs. 
Moreover, design law has been the historical 
basis of protection of minor innovation in both 
the United Kingdom and Germany. Nevertheless, 
it should be recalled that the design laws in 
Australia and Germany were considered too 
narrow to protect functional innovations and 
hence utility model laws were introduced. In 
the United Kingdom, an alternative solution was 
found to protect minor functional innovations 
– an unregistered design law was introduced. 
Finally, is there room for a misappropriation 
tort or a more extensive passing off or unfair 
competition law? This alternative has been 
adopted by Japan which has special 3-5 year 
unfair competition laws to protection minor 
innovation. 
The emulation approach - Emulation 
involves creating new hybrid rights. 
If a developing country does not 
have such a right, it would be the 
most expensive option in the short 
run. However, this expense is an 
immediate real cost which may 
be offset by long term benefits to 
the industrial environment such as 
increased international licensing 
opportunities. 
6.3	 The	Ideal	Utility	Model	
Law?	
Should it still be felt that policy considerations 
necessitate the introduction of a utility 
model system in a particular country, it is 
recommended that the following essential 
features be considered: 
•	 Subject matter of protection: The utility 
model law should comprise a detailed list 
of excluded subject matter which must 
mirror the exclusions under the patent 
law. Moreover, it is worth considering 
excluding some types of invention as 
dictated by public policy such as chemicals 
or pharmaceuticals or biological material 
or substances or processes 
•	 A renewal based term of protection: 
The term should be a minimum term of 3 
years (as the absolute minimum) but not 
exceeding the patent term of 20 years. 
However, a more appropriate maximum 
term based on existing utility model laws 
in several jurisdictions is 10 years
•	 A non-examination system: At least for 
the first period of registration. This is one 
of the key ingredients of the utility model 
system 
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•	 A compulsory examination/report for 
second stage: This procedure could be 
introduced if the term of protection is 
linked to a renewal procedure. 
•	 A compulsory examination / report when 
invalidation/infringement proceedings: 
This burden should be placed on the utility 
model rights holder to produce (and pay 
for) a detailed examination report as to the 
novelty and inventiveness of his invention 
prior to litigation
•	 Renewal fees: This is one suggested means 
to weed out the underutilised utility 
model
•	 Tiered fees: this is to enable the system 
to be friendly to small and medium sized 
enterprises or the individual inventor 
•	 Novelty : most developed countries have 
introduced universal novelty. Moreover, 
enforcement problems develop if a lower 
level of novelty (such as domestic or 
regional novelty) is adopted. 
•	 Government action: Introducing a 
completely new intellectual property 
system requires some effort on the part of 
all the relevant stakeholders (such as the 
relevant government agencies and patent 
attorneys/agents ) to engender “a utility 
model culture” such as an awareness 
education training program, helpdesk 
services, web and print literature, 
innovation fairs, etc. to inform potential 
users of how the new system works, and 
how it differs from existing standard patent 
and designs systems.
•	 Cross-licensing/compulsory licensing: A 
final issue is whether compulsory licensing 
provisions should be included on the same 
basis as patent law. This is especially 
important in the case of two conflicting 
rights whereby a subsequent inventor 
cannot obtain or exploit a patent or utility 
model without infringing a prior patent or 
utility model. This is especially important 
if a no-examination system is adopted. 
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ANNEX A 
Table	of	Utility	Models	Regimes	in	Central	&	Far	Eastern	Asia	and	
Pacific	Region	
Australia
Patents Act 1990, amended by Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000. 
2nd  tier protection comes within the innovation patent regime, which has no 
substantive examination prior to grant. The requirements are universal novelty, 
and an innovative step - which is a lower standard of inventive step. Term of 
protection = 8 years.
China
Patent Law & its Implementing Regulations, April 1, 1985, revised January 1, 
1993. Under Chinese law, utility models are defined as “any new technical solution 
relating to the shape, structure, or  their combination, of a product, which is fit 
for practical use. There is no substantive examination. Term of protection = 10 
years.
Hong Kong
Patents Ordinance 1997, Cap. 514, Part XV, s. 108 et seq. Short term patents   
protect a product or an industrial process which are new, inventive and have 
industrial application. No substantive examination. Term of protection = 8 years.
Indonesia 
Patents Act 1989, amended in 1997. Petty patent system, whereby a short term 
patent can be obtained for simple inventions of an apparatus, piece of equipment, 
tool or product having practical value because of its form, configuration, 
construction or composition. The invention must be novel, have inventive step 
and be industrially applicable. Note that protection is limited to 3 dimensional 
products. Term of protection = 10 years.
Japan
Law No. 123, April 13, 1959, as last amended on June 12, 1996, w.e.f. April 1, 
1997. Utility model protection granted to devices which are new and industrially 
applicable and which relate to the shape or construction of articles. Term of 
protection = 6 years.
Kazakhstan
Criminal Code, January 1, 1998, which is the basis of intellectual property 
protection. The Criminal Code establishes that the following are criminal acts: the 
illegal use a utility model; the unauthorised disclosure of the essence of a utility 
model before such information is officially made public; the misappropriation of 
authorship of an invention.
Korea
Utility Model Act, December 31, 1961, as amended July 1, 1999. The utility model 
must be novel, capable of industrial applicability, and possess an inventive step. 
Examination is only with respect to formalities. Term of protection = 7 years. 
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Kyrgyz 
Republic
Law on Temporary Provisions Concerning Industrial Property of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
August 2, 1993. “Utility models” are defined as new and industrially applicable 
features used in the production of consumer products or components of such 
products. The conditions for registration are novelty, and industrial applicability; 
the utility model must also possess a functional and inventive character. Domestic 
novelty is required. The application is examined ex officio for formalities only 
Term of protection = 8 years.
Macao
Macanese Industrial Property Act 1999. Utility models are models of objects 
or parts of objects (appliances, instruments, tools, containers, etc.) made 
for practical use, which, by means of a new shape or configuration or a new 
mechanism, increase or improve the handling of such objects. Utility models must 
be three-dimensional. Novelty, inventiveness and practical applicability are also 
required in the case of utility models, though the level of inventiveness is low. 
Term of protection = 15 years
Malaysia
Patents Act 1983, amended several times to 2004. Protection is accorded to 
utility innovation. The statutory definition of utility innovation is any innovation 
which creates a new product or process, or any new improvement of a known 
product or process which can be made or used in any kind of industry, and 
includes an invention. Term of protection = 15 years.
Philippines
Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act No. 8293, January 1, 1998; Implementing 
Regulations 1998. Any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity 
which is new and industrially applicable shall qualify for registration as a utility 
model. In particular, a utility model may be, or may relate to a useful machine; 
an implement or tool; a product or composition; or an improvement of any of the 
foregoing. An invention qualifies for registration as a utility model if it is new and 
industrially applicable. Local novelty is required. The utility model application is 
examined only as to formalities. Term of protection = 15 years 
Taiwan, 
Province of 
China 
Patent Law (Chapter III: New Utility Model Patent), May 29, 1944; January 21, 
1994. A “new utility model” is defined as a creation or an improvement which has 
been made in respect of the form, construction or fitting of an object. The utility 
model must be novel, capable of industrial applicability, and involve an inventive 
step. Examination is substantial. Term of protection = 12 years 
Thailand
Petty patent protection, January 6, 1999. To be eligible, an invention must be 
new and industrially applicable, though it will not need to possess an inventive 
step. Petty patent owners will be accorded an exclusive right to exploit their 
inventions. Term of protection = 10 years. 
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Turkey
Decree Law No 551 on the Protection of Patent Rights, June 27, 1995, amended 
by Law No 4128 of November 7, 1995. The law provides that inventions which are 
novel and applicable in industry may be protected by utility model certificates. 
The two conditions for registration are novelty and industrial applicability. Local 
novelty is required. Examination is for formalities only. A report as to the state of 
art, available under the patent system, will be drawn in respect of a utility model 
only on request of the applicant. Term of protection = 10 years 
Uzbekistan
Rules of Preparing and Filing Applications for Inventions and Utility Models, 
effective September 22, 1992. “Utility models” are defined as new and industrially 
applicable features used in the production of consumer products or components 
of such products. In order to be registered the utility model must be new and 
capable of industrial applicability. Novelty is determined at a universal level. 
The application is examined ex officio. The examination is cursory. The result 
of the examination is taken into account in determining questions of validity 
in the event of opposition, invalidation, or infringement proceedings. Term of 
protection = 8 years
Vietnam
Civil Code, effective July 1, 1996. According to the Civil Code there is also 
provision for utility models which are defined as incorporating technical solutions 
applicable in various social and economic fields. The emphasis in distinguishing 
between utility models and registered designs is the fact that utility models are 
technical in nature. The technical solution must be novel. Novelty is judged on a 
universal basis. Term of protection = 15 years
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